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The substantive theory o f technology argues that technology constitutes a new type o f
cultural system that radically restructures the social world as an object o f control. The device
paradigm modifies the substantive theory o f technology by describing how technology
transforms and deeply patterns everyday life and foreign affairs on the basis o f human
decisions or agreements. Using a “policy device,” the Nicaraguan contra war is explained
against a foreground o f political disengagement and cultural indifference and a background
o f imperialism and a struggling socialism.
The foreground o f a device is the commodity procured by the device. In the public
foreground (the internal component), the U.S. government claimed it was attempting to
procure greater political freedom inside Nicaragua. The background o f a device (the external
component) is its machinery. In the background o f policy, the U.S. used terror, intimidation,
contra forces and a variety o f illegal methods to force a political shift to occur inside
Nicaragua. The array o f policy devices used by the U.S. government to injure Nicaragua and
procure political damage were designed to be concealed, dependable, and unobtrusive to
those designated internal. Within Nicaragua, the injuring was palpable and felt by human
flesh. The U.S. received the comforting commodities, Nicaragua, the violent machinery o f
the policy device.
The political theory and ontological foundations o f the policy device is developed and
applied. The history and paradigmatic character of U.S.-Central American relations, captured
primarily as imperialism, is examined. The Sandinista administration’s failed attempts to
guide Nicaragua toward socialism, politically marginalize the privileges o f the elite and
redirect technology toward the common good is explained. The structure and empirical
consequences o f the contra war is shown to be an outcome o f historically designating
Nicaragua an external element o f the policy device. Failure o f the Sandinistas at nationwide
polls in 1990 and 1996 suggest the slow rise o f the standard device paradigm and its
indifference to strong social justice within Nicaragua. During the contra war we had terror
and indifference. Now we have an even less tractable situation, peace and indifference.
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C hapter 1
T error and Indifference

What happened in Nicaragua during the contra war is still being both resisted and
absorbed. A growing literature o f historical accounts, political analyses, and on the
ground reporting provide abundant facts that have passionately conveyed how policy and
values are compressed by the crucible o f combat. These accounts cast long shadows upon
the U.S. as they are told and retold, subverting and loosening to many degrees the deep
meanings and lessons they suggest. With all this uncovering, telling the untellable, a
greater problem remains - severe wounding inflicted on a society lingers, like shrapnel
lodged too deep to remove. Embedded shrapnel is a deep, nearly immutable memory of
injury which links Nicaragua’s suffering to U.S. policy. Wounds and scars are carried
forever.
The growing chaos and repression which spawned the National Sandinista
Liberation Front (FSLN) and their ultimately successful revolution in 1979 are an example
o f chaos not averted, o f change that was not incremental, controlled or glacial in pace.
When authoritarian order and oneness falls apart, fall back positions are prepared.
Contradictions are invented. United States official government thinking became obsessed
with the use o f polarities, with showing how different the U.S. and Nicaragua had become
in such a short time span. It is as if no similarities could be perceived anymore. Nicaragua
developed a counteridentity. This mechanistic thinking, built on the limited ideological
parameters available or expressible on Capitol Hill, matured quickly into a firm, cold logic
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that dehumanized and drove the contra war to its futile end.
Americans figure mainly in numerous forms o f annihilation created in United States
Central Intelligence Agency office space. Since there were no American dead seen in the
landscape o f our imagination, the sorrow o f war was not heartfelt. The deeper internal
events that solicit sympathy, care and emotional changes were largely absent. American
popular response was captured mainly as indifference. There was, o f course, dissent and
reporting o f events.
Implicit in the official U.S. government approach to Nicaragua during this period
was that the establishment o f socialism, a hostile social paradigm, would not be tolerated
in this hemisphere. This essay will look at deeper meanings o f the contra war and how the
true purposes o f U.S. activities in the contra war still need to be understood and culturally
absorbed. I will show how resisting these truths led inevitably to indifference.
This is a tale about a power struggle, competing plots to capture the hearts and
minds o f the Nicaraguan people, a plot with many forces looking, no, glaring at each
other. On the one side were the feces o f the FSLN with its Marxist-Leninist roots, literary
crusades, nationalization o f industry, land reform, and the rapid bureaucratization o f
government functions. From the U.S. came trained counterrevolutionary guerrilla armies
(contras), attacking health clinics, assassinating civilians, mining harbors and roads,
blowing up bridges, forcing recruitment and destabilizing what little infrastructure was left
after the insurrection o f 1979.
Using the device paradigm as a policy device, I will attempt to disclose how and why
the contra war gained momentum, complexity and injuring capacity amidst growing

indifference. The foreground o f a device is the commodity procured by the device.1 In
the public foreground, the U.S. government claimed that it was attempting to procure
greater political freedom inside Nicaragua by defeating and disabling the Sandinista
administration. The background o f a device is its machinery. In the background o f policy,
the U.S. used terror, intimidation and a variety o f other methods to cause a political shift
to occur inside Nicaragua.
The array o f devices used by the U.S. government to injure Nicaragua and procure
political damage were designed to be concealed, dependable, and unobtrusive to life in the
U.S. There was a bifurcation on the receiving end o f these devices. Inside the U.S. we
received policy, press releases, news, and information that could be quickly and easily
digested as information or ignored. Within Nicaragua, the injuring was palpable and felt
by human flesh. The U.S. got the comforting commodities, Nicaragua, the violent
machinery o f the policy device.
What is o f central concern here is not so much documenting and reliving the
atrocities o f the contra war, but o f breaking through the policy device which allowed it to
happen. A historical approach is enticing and leads one down the road toward
explanation, but the explanation takes on largely flat dimensions - this then that happened
and so forth. What I hope to do is to turn the mirror o f the policy device back onto
ourselves, onto U.S. culture, in an attempt to explain cultural indifference. Indifference is
a desensitization, a lack o f feeling for and engagement with others. This is not meant to
diminish or refute partisan political analyses, either from the left or right. What is crucial
is that as efforts to build, train, and deploy, the contras grew, the bulk o f citizens in this
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country did nothing and remained indifferent.
Copious articles, books, interviews and television coverage provided ample
opportunity to absorb this information, see the immense problems we were creating, and
take some form o f action to become involved in a humane solution. However, on the
whole, the U.S. population did nearly nothing to halt the unnecessary injuries to the
Nicaraguan population.
Although we are morally decent people and intellectually capable o f understanding
the role o f the U.S. in Central America, there was inadequate follow through by U.S.
citizens to change U.S. administrative policy. What happens is that we, the U.S. citizens,
became implicated in political decisions as well as in the pace and patterns o f everyday life.
Decisions that rain down bullets in Nicaragua, in the name o f the U.S. population, are
easily made because o f the great latitude granted to government, especially in foreign
affairs.
First, the term "implication" is important and must be elucidated. Implication, as I
will use it here, is how we have situated ourselves with respect to technology.2 We are all
involved deeply and implicitly in a technological society. The inconspicuous pattern by
which we live and orient ourselves has been described as a ruling paradigm, the device
paradigm, a social paradigm so deeply entrenched it not only informs how we conduct
ourselves from day to day, but it patterns the organizations, institutions and government
functions we rely upon and criticize.3 The device paradigm is also an ontological
paradigm, patterning our relation to the non-human world.4
How has the device paradigm put its stamp on U.S. - Nicaraguan relations? How
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can we traverse the scale and dimensions o f everyday life in an extremely affluent,
advanced industrial country toward the poverty, disease and war o f a poor Central
American country using the device paradigm as our guide?
The device paradigm insists that life is clearly patterned along the divide o f work and
leisure.5 Work is largely the constant servicing and expansion o f the technological
machinery, which creates the infinite stream o f commodities, consumed in our leisure time.
Work entails a deep embodiment in the patterns o f life. The human creature at work is
immersed in his interaction with the world, far too immersed to extract himself from it (he
may die if he stops working), and thus almost without cessation he enacts a set of
movements across the passing days and years.
Leisure time, or playtime, in contrast requires that the person be only half submerged
in the world o f activity, able to enter and exit freely. The playful activity, even if never
engaged in before, can be started in seconds, or ended just as quickly. Consumption
makes no demands o f skill or discipline. The person in leisure or at play, protected by the
separability o f himself from his own activity, does not put himself at risk. At play he acts
on the world outside his body with less intensity than the person at work does. If he
sometimes puts that world at risk (the leisure world), it is because his own immunity from
risk makes him inattentive to the forms o f alteration he is bringing about. It is the very
nature o f work - as is dramatically visible in forms o f physical labor and craft such as coal
mining, farming, building or inventing - that the worker "works" to bring about severe
alterations in the world (relocating a bridge, building a piano, road or a house where there
was none), and only brings about those alterations by consenting to be himself altered

(that his muscles, posture and gate will be altered is certain, that he may undergo more
severe alteration or injury is at least risked).6 Work, o f course, is a wide spectrum o f
experience. The trend in a high-tech society such as ours, is that contact in the world o f
work can be attenuated to the pushing o f buttons and the monitoring o f dials and
computers. The slow disappearance o f drudgery and toil through work is not replaced in
the world o f leisure.
U.S. citizens living in this pattern o f work and play raise children, get involved in
numerous activities and busy themselves with ever more refined leisure activities. Not
being especially bad or ignorant, we have consented to create a culture patterned after the
device paradigm- The problem is that the great success o f technology in attacking hunger,
disease, illiteracy, transportation, communication and education (in fulfilling the promise
o f technology) has given way to an attempt to discover remaining burdens and seek and
welcome devices that will further disburden us from even these benign burdens.7 There
are terrible debilitating effects created by life under the device paradigm. The most
debilitating is the withdrawal from political life. The withdrawal o f politics as real, as
meaningful, and worthy o f attention and intervention is an abiding problem.8 Perhaps
political failure is the most fundamental type o f human failure. By political failure, I mean
the failure to recognize and influence the social origins and consequences o f political
decisions which affect society.
Our attention span, under the rule o f the device paradigm, has thus been constricted
to the narrow sphere o f work and the inconsequential sphere o f consumption. Work and
leisure (especially leisure), in a technological society, are filled with imagination and

information that could cause something like world citizenship to occur.9 However, the
contra war showed again what a callous disregard we have for people less fortunate than
ourselves and affected directly by U.S. war making.
The activity o f war is, viewed within the framework o f this opposition
(work/leisure), the most unceasingly radical and rigorous form o f work.10 The soldier's
survival is at stake not in the diffuse way it is for the worker who out o f his labor creates
his own sustenance and will, if he stops, eventually starve; it is more immediately and
acutely at stake; it is another soldier's direct object to kill him, and his own work is a
target for the other. The form o f world alteration to which he devotes himself does not
simply entail the possibility o f injury but is itself injuring, and it is this form o f self
alteration to which his own body is at every moment subject.11 He cannot will his entry
and exit from the activity o f war on a daily basis. There is not, as there is for most
workers, a brief interval o f exemption at the end o f the day when he is permitted to enact a
wholly different set of gestures, when the divide between work and leisure is crossed. The
timing o f his eventual exit from war will not be determined by his own will but by the end
o f the war, whether that comes in days, months or years, and there is o f course a very high
probability that even when the war ends he will never exit from it. The boy or man in war
is, to an extent, found in almost no other form o f work, inextricably bound up with the
men and materials o f his labor. He learns to perceive himself as he will be perceived by
others, as indistinguishable from the men o f his unit, regiment, division and above all
national group. He is also inextricably bound up with the qualities and conditions - forest,
field, rainforest, desert - o f the ground over which he walks or runs or crawls and with

which he craves and attempts identification.12 In the camouflage clothing and the
camouflage postures is his work, now running bent over parallel with the ground, now
arching forward conforming the curve o f the back to a companion boulder, now standing
upright and still and narrow as the slender tree behind which he hides. He is the trees and
the wind, he is a small piece o f Nicaraguan terrain broken off and floating dangerously
through the rain forest. He is a fragment o f American earth wedged into a hillside near
Estili. He is dark blue like the sea. He is light gray like the air through which he flies. He
is sodden in the green shadows o f earth.
The extreme difference in the degree o f a person's separability from his own activity
in work, leisure and in war is one manifestation o f the distance that separates them. There
is an estrangement between the military and mainstream society. We know that billions
are spent on supporting the military. In the case o f a covert war fought with proxy armies
there is a major discrepancy in the scale o f consequences. Given this discrepancy how do
you make a war intelligible to a comfortable citizenry? You make war into a game or
contest.
The comparison o f a war and gaming is nearly obscene. This analogy either
trivializes war or conversely attributes to gaming a weight and consequence it cannot bear.
To flatly assert an equality, war is a game, games are war, imports attributes from one into
the other’s sphere. This transfer may occur in either direction. The hatred that in war
grants nothing to an opponent (as the U.S. did to a Sandinista-led Nicaragua) is
sometimes imported into descriptions o f peacetime games and contents that now become
in their competitive urge and obsession disguised forms o f the passion to destroy others.

Nevertheless, an identification must be made because war is in its overall structure o f
action a contest.13
The difficulty for U.S. citizens entrenched within the device paradigm is that
movements and activities o f the contestants o f a covert contra war are largely unseen.
The men described above as inextricably engulfed in the materials and labor o f their task
are moving across the land toward others who, equally engulfed, move toward them and
like them, work to out-perform the other in their appointed labor. In the case o f the
contra war, the Sandinistas sought to make and preserve their new world while the contra
army saw it as an opportunity to unmake the Sandinistas world. American troops were
not directly involved in the contra war. The language o f contest is critical because it
registers the central fact o f reciprocity. In order for the U.S. to show that the contest was
at all even it had to remind us that we were fighting a U.S.S.R. backed communist regime,
a formidable, well-funded, and worthy opponent. As I will later show in this essay,
numerous national entities became involved in the massive planning, organizing, and
financing; however, the overall contest can be crystallized and reduced to two discreet
entities: contras (U.S.) versus Sandinistas (Nicaragua). The central activity o f war is
injuring.14 War in its formal structure is a contest. Another twist on this story is that the
U.S. recruited largely Nicaraguans to fight their own people. Thus the U.S. fostered a
civil war pitting brother against brother.
How can the device paradigm help us to understand the nature o f war? Specifically,
how can a nation drift effortlessly through history while at the same time destroying and
creating history in another nation? In what way does living within the device paradigm
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lead to desensitization? Perhaps the crucial institution that must be understood is that of
government. Government is the iynch-pin, the go-between, o f citizens and their external
affairs. Political action in a technological society usually revolves around domestic affairs
and securing for all the benefits and virtues o f a technological society. Citizens support
the government machinery through the payment o f taxes. The machinery o f government
has its paradigmatic inaccessibility, yet in some respects remains an open system.15 There
are votes, debates, access to records, lobbying. Policy experts weigh in on any substantive
debates, especially any concerning national security. However, citizen action is at a
deplorably low level; fewer than one half o f all eligible voters typically cast a ballot.
Neither the foreground o f our culture, the consumption o f and movement through
commodities, nor the background, the political and economic conditions which secure a
peace in which raw materials are transformed into the hard invisible technological
machinery that ultimately delivers commodities, were touched at all by the contra war, nor
the Persian Gulf War for that matter. This bespeaks a tremendous stability o f the
technological order.16 The pace and texture o f life in the U.S. during the contra war did
not change. Throughout the 1980's the economy expanded. There were, o f course,
economic changes within the U.S., but the clear fact is that the contra war did not disrupt
American life. Some were moved to act in opposition to the war, but most were
unaffected and were probably uninterested and indifferent to what was happening to this
obscure country in Central America.
The policy device that sponsors war is an example of how the device paradigm can
pattern foreign affairs. The device paradigm is devoted to technological affluence. That

which supports the accumulation or concentration o f wealth is supported, according to the
theory o f the device paradigm.17 In Nicaragua, however, the process o f accumulation o f
wealth and widespread impoverishment were both promoted by the Somoza dictatorship
which combined systematic electoral fraud with open repression. Evidence o f the device
paradigm within mainstream Nicaragua was thus largely absent during the Somoza era
(1934-1979). Evidence o f strong social justice within Nicaragua was also absent during
this same period. The Sandinistas viewed the concentration o f wealth as fundamentally in
conflict with a just society. Inadequate attention to social justice will be examined as an
unresolved and disturbing component o f the device paradigm. By exploiting these major
structural flaws in Nicaraguan society, the Sandinistas were able to form a large tactical
alliance which overthrew the Somoza government. After the revolution the Sandinistas
openly guided the nation toward socialism. I will show in chapter 2 that the unresolved
part o f the device paradigm is resolved in socialism in favor o f social justice but to the
detriment o f the technological machinery and affluence, the Sandinista government o f
Nicaragua (1979-1990) being the case in point. Chapter 3 is an examination o f the history
o f U.S. - Nicaragua relations under the guiding idea that imperialism, as an extreme form
o f the device paradigm, divides people into an internal and an external component. Where
internal, people become workers and consumers (U.S.); where external, they become,
partly due to fear of communism and o f the possible priority o f social justice, an
exploitable resource (Nicaragua). The ontological foundations o f technology using
Heidegger will also be explained. Chapter 4 will show how making people into an
external resource leads to terror and violence. The terrorist policies o f the U.S.

government toward Nicaragua during the Contra War will be examined, as well as their
consequences. Chapter 5 draws the conclusions; the defeat o f the Sandinistas at the polls
in 1990 and 1996 shows the rise o f the standard device paradigm and its indifference to
strong social justice within Nicaragua. Current social conditions inside Nicaragua will be
assessed. Now there is peace and indifference rather than terror and indifference - a much
preferable state, but one that is not morally encouraging. Because the device paradigm
leads to political disengagement, the exploited will remain at the margins o f awareness,
power, and affluence.

C hapter 2
The FSLN, Socialism and the Device Paradigm

Social conditions in Nicaragua were deplorable for the vast majority o f citizens prior
to the revolution. However, certain groups did benefit from the Somoza dictatorship,
namely the Guardia and the economic elite. Somoza did not reinvest in the infrastructure,
did not educate the children, and did not ensure that health care was provided. Poverty
was, and unfortunately remains, the norm. The detailed mechanics o f how and why
Nicaragua became integrated into and dependent on the U.S. economy is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 3. Suffice it to say, that poverty is a human artifact produced by
the exploitation o f the many by the few. The latter who have traditionally ruled the
country for their own selfish ends were joined and supported in this exploitative behavior
by powerful foreign interests. The FSLN was able to theoretically address these problems
to gain political support during their period o f armed struggle and insurrection, 19611979.
Roughly, what developed over time in Nicaragua was a system that many scholars
came to label as “dependency” or “neodependency.”1Most who write on this subject
agree that dependency is a complex political, economic and social phenomenon that serves
to block human development o f the majority in certain privilege-dominated Third World
countries where the economies are heavily externally oriented. In such countries, one
finds that even during periods o f rapid economic growth the benefit o f such growth fails to
13
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“trickle down” in any but the most trivial way to the majority o f people. Social stagnation
o f dependent countries is due, according to dependency theory, to the combination o f
income-concentrating, externally oriented, and externally conditioned form of capitalism
with political systems controlled by those privileged minorities who benefit from such
poorly distributed growth.
It is very important to note that in order for the dependency syndrome, with all o f its
negative human and ecological consequences, to exist, it is necessary for a country to have
both an externally oriented economy and a socially irresponsible political elite.2 External
economic orientation, though essential, is not enough in and o f itself to cause the socially
regressive dependency syndrome. Japan and South Korea have economies which are both
heavily externally oriented. However, the political leadership in those two more tightly
knit societies appears to have a greater sense o f social responsibility than the elites o f
Latin America, and, hence, externally stimulated growth has led to a general rise in the
standard o f living. In these two countries, politicians supported private enterprise,
infrastructure, human development and public health. The device paradigm is alive and
well in those two countries, and many similar countries. The primary evidence o f the
device paradigm is in advanced capitalist countries. Evidence o f the device paradigm in
the Third World will grow only if middle class consumption increases in these areas.
Evidence o f the device paradigm is manyfold and occurs on many levels. The device
paradigm is the dominant way the promise o f technology is fulfilled. The promise of
technology is the way certain cultures have given form to the 18th century enlightenment
ideals o f liberty, equality and self-realization.3 In other words, the promise o f technology
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is o f a piece with these root concepts o f democracy. Technology promises to control
nature, liberate people from misery and toil, and to enrich our lives. Democracy needs
technology, to thrive. Where the device paradigm thrives, there is usually thought to be a
free and prosperous nation. To be more precise, there are several crucial features which
evidence the device paradigm: ubiquity o f commodities,4 divided labor,5 political
disengagement,6 a secure nearly invisible infrastructure,7 large scale consumption,8 and
indifference to those at the margins o f affluence.9 Where these features are absent, so is
the device paradigm. Measurement o f the device paradigm is consumer spending,
indirectly measured by personal income and the gross domestic product.10 Marx
embraced the fruits o f the device paradigm but saw problems with their distributioa
Toppling the dictatorial apparatus that the Somoza family created and expanded
over the years was the main goal of the FSLN. This was extremely difficult due to the
National Guard, or Guardia, which was created and run by the Somozas to keep a tight
reign over its operations and politics. Anastazio Somoza Garcia (Somoza I) commanded
the Guardia in 1934. The Guardia, over time, became a private army, the military wing o f
the Liberal Party, which enforced the rules o f the Somoza dictatorship.11 Dissolving the
Guardia was, o f course, one plank in the Sandinista’s political platform.
Anastazio Somoza Garcia had two sons, Tachito and Luis. Tachito's brother Luis,
(Somoza II) died o f a heart attack in April 1967. This event signaled the concentration o f
political power and the entire family fortune in Tachito's (Somoza I ll’s) hands. Estimates
o f the Somoza's wealth at the time vary enormously; different sources at the time placed it
anywhere between $50 million and $300 million.12 In 1968 the Somoza family occupied
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an area equal in size to the neighboring republic o f El Salvador; they owned about half of
all registered landholdings in Nicaragua, and a quarter o f the nation's best arable soil.13 In
the countryside they were administered by two firms, Compania Agropecuaria and
Sucesores del General Somoza; in urban areas they were mainly registered in the name of
Salvadora Debayle de Somoza, Tachito's mother.14 In his largest fincas Somoza produced
the countries main export commodities: cotton, coffee, beef and also sugar, an important
newcomer which was introduced in the Nicaraguan economy when the Somozas' antiCastroism was rewarded by Washington with a sizable chunk of the old Cuban sugar
quota.15 Other smaller units offered a staggering variety o f produce: cocoa, tobacco,
bananas, pineapples, maize, beans, rice, sorghum, sesame and all kinds o f vegetables. A
score o f industrial and service companies completed the picture. The Somozas owned
Mamenic (the Nicaraguan shipping line), Lanica (the country’s airline), the cement plant,
textile factories, sugar mills and the local concession o f Mercedes Benz. By 1978, after
two heart attacks and a nerve-racking absence out o f the country for three months,
Tachito Somoza Debayle returned to Nicaragua to preside over an emergency meeting
where Tachito supposedly signed over his holding in the Somoza business empire to the
rest o f the family.16 For the first time, it was reported that a notarized statement listed the
full extent o f the family fortune. The most frequently mentioned figure was $600,000,000
for Tachito alone, and more than $1,000,000,000 if one took into account the joint
holdings o f all branches o f the family, the Sevillas, Debayles, Sacasas, Pallais and their
multiple permutations.17 An anonymous inventory o f Somoza owned enterprises
circulating at the time in Managua listed 346 companies covering eveiy imaginable field o f

17

activity: coffee, sugar, cotton, agriculture and commerce in general, textiles, shipping,
customs agencies, travel agencies, fishing, meat packing, cattle ranching, warehouses, a
harbor, air transport, construction, aluminum products, oil refining, match manufacturing,
tobacco, publicity, recreation centers, banking, real estate, cement, consulting firms, auto
sales, furniture, electrical appliances, dairy products, footwear, distilleries, publishing
houses, radio, television, geothermal energy, pipelines, fertilizers, rice, shipbuilding,
mining, recording, computing, laundromats, even exports o f human blood and plasma.18 I
list all these companies not to bore the reader, but to illustrate the greed and vast holdings
o f the Somoza family. Not only did Somoza exert extreme economic power through his
land holdings and enterprises and payoffs, he directly appointed municipal officials and
would quickly dispatch the Guardia anywhere in the country to quell political uprisings.
Repression and poverty throughout the country actually grew and became intolerable.
Over the decades various political organizations came into being and cracks began to form
in the Somoza edifice.
Culturally, the difference between 1934-1979 (the Somoza era) in Nicaragua and the
same period in the U.S., is that few o f the critical features o f the device paradigm were
present in Nicaragua, while in the U.S. the device paradigm grew in strength and became a
more fully entrenched lifestyle, even among the aspiring poor. The middle class continued
to expand in the U.S. while in Nicaragua no such social change occurred. The device
paradigm is devoted to the pursuit o f technological affluence. Affluence is prosperity that
is characteristic o f technology and consists in the possession and consumption of the most
numerous, refined and varied commodities.19 The goal o f the affluent is to live now.

There is undeniable appeal in this rich imperial life that is the fulfillment o f the promises o f
technology: liberation, enrichment and conquest.20 Affluence is defined by personal
income. Therefore personal income determines one’s standard o f living in a technological
society. The way equality is roughly measured in a technological society is by comparing
the income levels o f various social groups within the society.21 Social justice can be
understood as an equal level o f affluence.22 There were, perhaps, groups o f people in
Nicaragua during the late Somoza era which lived the affluent life, in the above sense.
However, they were few and far between. In Nicaragua, there was very limited political
liberty and practically no technological affluence. The social unrest in the 1950’s and
1960’s inside the U.S. taught us that there is a significant flaw in the pursuit of
technological affluence, and that is the absence o f strong social justice. However, the
lack o f social justice in the U.S. was moderated by a rising standard o f living, social action
and the courts; the situation was not as extreme as in Nicaragua where armed struggle was
the only possible solution.
What the FSLN did, and by 1978 almost the entire country, was identify a ruling
elite which controlled a huge portion o f economic and political power and which used its
own private army, the Guardia, to enforce this repressive social order. The socialists did
not have a problem identifying a definite exploiting capitalist class. The FSLN, in alliance
with progressive business sectors defeated Somoza and the Guardia in 1979.
The Somoza administration could be described as authoritarian and took the form o f
a military dictatorship. There was no clearly articulated ideology. Somoza’s speeches are
likely to be as good a guide as any. Somoza, to the end, defended himself negatively, as a
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responsible alternative to communism. Authoritarianism is, in this sense, primarily
defensive. Authoritarianism is against change, against the inefficiency and corruption o f a
parliamentary democracy. Authoritarianism gives the highest place among political values
to security: Hobbes’ first “law o f nature” was to seek peace.23 Authoritarianism endorses
unlimited government, free from constitutional constraint and attaching no great
importance to the rule o f law.24
Castro, communism and strong social justice were seen as threats that seriously
menaced security. These threats were generated both internally and from outside. The
Somoza dictatorship was an example o f technology that was admitted in pieces and parts,
but controlled by an oligarchy. As for military technology, it is clear that the Guardia was
an example o f the use o f technology against people in an attempt to crush liberty. To get
ahead under the Somoza regime you either had to (1) work for Somoza directly or
indirectly or (2) join the Guardia or agree to be a political appointee. The Sandinistas had
grand plans to erase political support for authoritarian rule and create a socialist society.
The Sandinistas draw heavily from Marx and Lenin in their ideology. They have also
attempted to turn Sandino into a Marxist even though Sandino focused on the removal o f
the U.S. marines, not the bourgeoisie elite. Instead o f Sandino’s ideas, the Sandinistas
adopted their hero’s symbols, his image, and his myth.
Neither the FSLN nor the revolutionary government formally labeled itself Marxist.
However, in numerous speeches and interviews, Sandinista leaders have acknowledged
their debt to Marxism.
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"We, the founders and builders o f the FSLN, prepared our strategy, our tactics and
our program, on the basis o f Marx's teachings,"25
“I believe we are Marxists.”26
“[We] are guided by the scientific doctrine o f revolution, by Marxism-Leninism.”27

The Sandinistas have treated Marxism as a body o f insights that they could adapt to their
own needs and Nicaraguan conditions. Marxism is the basic source o f Sandinista thought.
However, Sandinista leadership was suspicious o f abstract theory. Fonseca warned the
party leader o f the dangers o f "sterile dogmatism" and "pseudo-Marxist gobbledygook"
and even suggested that Nicaraguan radicals were lucky to know so little about political
theory.28 Their political innocence, he believed, saved them from political paralysis and
internecine conflict.
Marx's intellectual legacy is subject to various interpretations. Any Marxist attempt
to understand the world must come to grips with the historical schema Marx and his
collaborator, Engels, first laid out in the 1848 Communist Manifesto. The Manifesto
scenario forms the background against which the broad outline o f Sandinista theory
developed.
In the Manifesto and much o f his subsequent work, Marx was concerned with the
transitional periods that separate three great historical epochs: feudalism, capitalism, and
socialism. Marx analyzed the sweeping economic transformation that undermined feudal
society and the political revolutions that substituted the rule o f the bourgeoisie - the
modernizing class o f merchants and industrialists who promoted economic change - for
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that of the land-owning aristocracy.29 The capitalist order that arose out of feudalism
freed the peasant masses from hereditary obligations o f serfdom and created
unprecedented material abundance.
But capitalism, Marx concluded, was a flawed system. As it matured, capitalist
society was itself moving inexorably toward self-destruction. The wrenching boom-andbust cycle of the capitalist economy demonstrated the inability of the system to manage its
own explosive productivity. The proletariat - the class o f urban wage earners created by
capitalist growth - threatened the political stability o f the bourgeois order. Exploited by
their employers and victimized by periodic depressions, the workers were developing a
consciousness o f their own interests and a capacity for political organization which would
allow them to challenge the rule o f the bourgeoisie and assume the lead in the creation o f a
new, just, and rational society: socialism.
The parallel that Marx draws between the two transitions depends on an implicit
theory o f progressive classes. At a critical moment in history, the progressive class, by
pursuing its own objectives, moves the entire society forward. The bourgeoisie played
this role in the first transformation. The proletariat would do so in the second.
Marx was convinced that human consciousness advanced in tandem with the
material aspects o f society.30 Historically, as people extended their control o f nature and
learned to cooperate for purposes o f production, they freed themselves from superstition
and developed a more progressive social consciousness. His view suggests a long-term
optimism about the capacity o f people to remake themselves. But it also carries a
qualifying, short-run pessimism. If consciousness is linked to material progress, it cannot
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leap ahead o f material development. Marx would not, for example, expect socialist ideas
to prosper among feudal peasants or, for that matter, the peasants o f contemporary
Nicaragua: their backward material lives limited their political outlook.31
Marx was a brilliant sociologist. Much o f what is known about the social bases of
class consciousness depends on his insights. But he was obviously less successful as a
prophet. The urban-based proletarian revolutions that he expected in advanced capitalist
societies never came. Instead, the revolutionary upheavals of the twentieth century
occurred in backward rural societies, like Russia, Mexico, and China. As social theorists
and revolutionaries surveyed the failure, they raised questions about Marx’s work that
would later be relevant to the development o f Sandinismo.
One set o f questions concerned the role o f leadership. Do historical processes lead
inevitably to revolution or do they require the efforts o f radical intellectuals and
professional revolutionaries like Marx and Lenin to unleash their potential? Another
concerned the locus o f revolution. If revolutions were not taking place in advanced
capitalist societies, why not? Could a socialist revolution take place in a materially
undeveloped society? A third set o f questions revolved around the post-revolutionary
situation. If socialist revolutionaries came to power in a backward society, could they
immediately initiate socialist policies or would they have to promote capitalist
development to achieve the level o f material abundance that Marx required as a
precondition o f socialism? In either case, what should be the character o f the post
revolutionary state? Decades o f Marxist debate have swirled about these questions.
No participant in the debate has been more influential than V.I. Lenin, whose ideas have
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dominated Latin American thinking about Marx since the 1920's. Lenin’s contribution
centers on the vanguard party, imperialism and the revolutionary state.
Lenin’s conception o f a vanguard party did more than any other Marxist idea to
shape the FSLN. Lenin contended that a vanguard organization o f professional
revolutionaries was a prerequisite to socialist revolution. Without the leadership o f a
vanguard party, the workers, however militant, could never advance beyond what Lenin
called “trade union consciousness,” the viewpoint that focuses on narrow economic issues
- hours and wages in a given firm or industry - while ignoring the character o f the larger
society, its economic system. Lenin proposed that membership in the vanguard party be
selective. Only the most able, dedicated, and politically sophisticated would be allowed to
join. Members o f the vanguard would have to be clandestine, disciplined, and centralized,
while at the same time, they immersed themselves in the lives o f workers and the activities
o f their unions and political organizations. The vanguard party exists to channel the
“spontaneous” protests o f the masses. “Unless the masses are organized, the proletariat
is nothing;” Lenin wrote in 1905. “Organized - it is everything.”32
Lenin, like Marx, characterized all states as inherently class based and coercive.
“The state”, he declared, “is nothing but a machine for the oppression o f one class by
another.”33 Only primitive societies, or future socialist societies, in which class distinctions
have been eliminated can escape the logic o f their definition. Having no classes, they have
no state.
Lenin explicitly rejected the notion that Western democratic states, based on
universal suffrage, stand above classes. He regarded parliamentary democracy as the form
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o f class rule peculiar to capitalism, a convenient facade o f abstract political equality to
conceal the objective reality o f economic oppression.34 Thus, he saw no prospect that
socialism could evolve peacefully out o f democracy.
If the state is inevitably coercive and class-bound, Lenin reasoned, the revolution
must first smash the capitalist state and replace it with a proletarian state capable o f
constructing a socialist order over the resistance o f the bourgeoisie - in Marx’s words, “a
dictatorship o f the proletariat.” The working class, wrote Lenin, must develop “undivided
power directly backed by the armed force o f the people. The overthrow o f the
bourgeoisie can be achieved only by the proletariat becoming the ruling class capable of
crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance o f the bourgeoisie, and o f organizing the
working and exploited people for the new economic system.”35
Lenin conceived o f the revolutionary movement as an alliance o f urban workers and
poor peasants organized by a vanguard party - “the teacher, the guide, the leader” o f the
people in their effort to “reorganize their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the
bourgeoisie.”36 As this account implies, Lenin conceived the dictatorship o f the proletariat
as a transitory historical phenomenon bridging capitalism and socialism. In the process o f
eliminating private ownership o f the means o f production - the economic basis o f class
differentiation - the revolutionary state abolishes social classes. By definition, there is no
longer a role for the state. Lenin was convinced that the administration o f common
affairs, in the absence o f class antagonism, would be a simple matter.
The Sandinistas deeply and radically internalized the idea o f class conflict. Their
ideology started from the Marxist premise that class conflict is inevitable and a source of
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progress in human history. In a pamphlet directed at students in 1968, the FSLN declared,
“Historical experience.... teaches that there can be no peace between millionaires and
workers ... that there can be no situations other than the following: either the rich exploit
the poor or the poor free themselves, eliminating the privileges o f the millionaires.”37
The text, written by Fonseca, goes on to attack the “demagogic” notion propagated by
Christian Democrats that there can be “conciliation o f classes.” A popular glossary o f
political terms issued in 1980 by Sandinista agricultural workers union and the
Agricultural Ministry observes, “In the capitalist mode o f production there are two
fundamental classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which have opposed interests.”38
This indicates that Sandinista leadership did not, or could not, see a continuum between
the desires o f the affluent and the desires and aspirations o f the poor and oppressed
whereas here in the U.S. there is a much different understanding o f the way wealth and
income are distributed. In the U.S. people openly strive for affluence. Most remain
comfortably in the middle class while the lower and lowest economic classes strive to be
middle class and the middle class desires to be upper middle, and so on. This dynamic
prevents the formation o f class consciousness and drives the development and maturing o f
the device paradigm. The Sandinistas never saw things this way and ultimately paid a
huge political price because o f it.
The Sandinista Front has consistently described its own ideology, historical role,
objectives, strategy, friends, and enemies in class terms. The party’s leaders frequently
observed that Sandinista thought is “classist.”39 The FSLN is the “leader o f the class
struggle” and seeks to change the “balance between classes in favor o f the oppressed.”40
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Formulations o f the movement’s friends and enemies have varied with political conditions,
but the workers and peasants are virtually always counted as revolutionary allies (with
somewhat stronger emphasis on the former) and leading sections o f the bourgeoisie, in
league with imperialism, are seen as opponents.
Sandinista leadership has always shown frith in Marxism. But Sandinista thinkers
from Carlos Fonseca to the leadership o f the 1980's have understood that classical
Marxism did not fit Nicaraguan conditions very well. The economic and political system
that the Sandinistas saw in their country was not the capitalism (or for that matter the
feudalism) o f the Communist Manifesto. Rather it was a distorted form o f capitalist
development that reflected the influence o f “imperialism.” Sandinista spokesmen loosely
used the term imperialism to refer to the economic and political power o f the advanced
capitalist countries, especially the United States. In an imperialist world the capitalist
powers “exercise a hegemonic power over other countries (their colonies), which they
subjugate by strong links o f political and economic dependency, and impede their
economic growth.”41 Development was distorted by an emphasis on the production o f
exports such as coffee and cotton, needed by the wealthy capitalist countries. “Our
frustration”, Sandinista agricultural minister Jaime Wheelock once observed, “was to grow
sugar, cocoa, and coffee for the United States; we served dessert at the imperialist dinner
table.”42 Wheelock and other Sandinista analysts concluded that the Nicaraguan economy,
because o f its distorted character, was incapable o f self-sustaining growth and unable to
meet the basic material needs o f its own people.43
The working poor o f Nicaragua knew they were oppressed but because o f the
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distortions o f the Nicaraguan economy failed to develop a clear sense o f class identity.
Most o f the salaried labor force in export agriculture worked seasonally and depended on
subsistence agriculture or marginal urban employment between harvests. Nonetheless, the
Sandinistas overcame the inadequacies o f the proletariat by stretching the definition o f the
class base e f the revolution and by emphasizing the vanguard role o f the party. The FSLN
came to conceive o f itself as a leader o f the “worker-peasant alliance.”44 There was much
maneuvering, within the FSLN during the long years prior to the revolution, over the
appropriate class basis for the revolutionary movement.
The faction within the FSLN which ultimately was triumphant, called the Terceristas,
called for broadening the revolutionary movement. In their 1977 Platform, the Terceristas
leaders proposed a “triple bloc made up o f the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petite
bourgeoisie” as the “moving force o f the revolution.”45 The proletariat (defined to include
both urban and rural wage earners) is the “fundamental force” o f the revolution.46 The
petite bourgeoisie is defined to include “artisans, professionals, shopkeepers, people
involved in service activities, and revolutionary students and intellectuals.”47 The antiSomoza bourgeoisie were not regarded as part o f the inner revolutionary “triple bloc” but
as a partner in a Sandinista-dominated coalition. The coalition with the broad class o f
middle sectors o f the economy was described as a “temporary and tactical alliance.”48 The
ultimate role o f the middle sectors and even o f the bourgeoisie remained nebulous in
Sandinista thinking. The Sandinista party hoped to mobilize and serve the workers and
peasants.
Nothing is so central to the Sandinistas conception o f themselves and their place in
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history as their definition o f the FSLN as a revolutionary vanguard.49 Vanguard is the
most common, yet troubling, word in the Sandinista lexicon.50 The Sandinistas owe this
powerful idea to Lenin, who conceived o f an elite party o f ideologically motivated,
disciplined professional revolutionaries capable o f guiding a politically immature people
through a process of radical social transformation.51 The vanguard party has a conscious,
heroic link with history. They are history in the making. The Sandinista vanguard is not
only a leader in the class struggle but also one o f a passionate ‘Tew men and women who
at a given moment in history seem to contain within themselves the dignity o f all
people.”52
The vanguard sets the example, they are the "standards” for all to see and compare
themselves to. Through struggle, the people as a whole reclaim the strength and dignity
shown by a few. The exploited need a vanguard to lead them to their "definitive
liberation." In a Sandinista broadside, party strategy is mapped out:

The revolutionary party, by taking a firm class position, a scientific ideology,
correct strategy and tactics, united in political principles, places itself at the
forefront o f all society and gathers in its bosom the political and military leadership
o f the revolutionary forces which struggle and work to bring the revolution
towards bigger achievements.53

To be on the edge, the forefront, the party must draw into itself "advanced" elements o f
the working class. In a sense, the party acts as a stand-in, or surrogate, for the proletariat
masses. This is implicit in FSLN party declarations like, "the workers control power
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through the FSLN" or "the working class is in power in Nicaragua."54
The FSLN, especially its revolutionary leadership, is the organization o f working
people that has returned power to the workers after seizing it from Somocismo. This
thinking appears to equate the party with those it serves. It implies class representation
not in a Western parliamentary sense but in the historic sense o f Tellez's comment about a
"few men and women."
The vanguard guards and leads. It guards its accomplishments and steers society
through complex, never-ending revolutionary stages, all the while working on behalf of the
formerly oppressed masses. Its goal is to carry through with a social revolution and a
transformation o f the political consciousness o f the country. It is the bridge between the
national liberation stage o f the revolutionary process and the social revolution which
follows.
The vanguard is fraught with difficulty and tension, especially after it has deposed
the unpopular regime and assumed political power. The vanguard literates and empowers
yet at the same time controls and transforms. It is in a position to coerce those it purports
to represent. What does the vanguard do if the masses resist its vision for the future or
when the vanguard party asks for sacrifice in exchange for uncertain future benefits?
The vanguard may lose the sympathy o f the workers but it retains the sympathy o f
history. Life consists o f constant struggle and sacrifice that evoke worry and despair. A
further problem o f the vanguard is that it instructs its membership to learn from the masses
as well as to educate and politically lead them, Thomas Borge, a co-founder o f the FSLN
and a ruling Sandinista commandante from 1979 to 1990, said in 1981 that "We must
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banish any manifestation o f paternalism, o f elitism...we must comprehend that it is
necessary to guide the masses...Learn from the masses in order to guide the masses, that
should be the guide for our organization."55
Can Borge be correct? Is it possible for the vanguard to escape paternalism?.
Simply, no. I agree with Dennis Gilbert that the vanguard assumes power over the
populace, much like a parent over a child.56 Like a parent, it can only be successful if it
prepares its charges for an independent existence and then relinquishes or shares power
with them in the process. This is no easy matter judging by the behavior o f ruling
vanguard parties in this century.
As Stephen Kinzer points out with innumerable examples in Blood o f Brothers, the
Nicaraguan "masses" thought many Sandinista policies both oppressive and absurd and
personally took great pains to either dodge the new rules or leave Nicaraguan soil
completely.57 Kinzer notes that many rural people are fiercely independent and are very
resistant to Sandinista initiatives in agrarian reform and trade.58 From Kinzer's perspective
the FSLN failed because it heeded only one element o f Borge’s directive, LEAD.59 It did
not learn to listen and abide by the diverse needs o f its constituents. Kinzer's perspective
has depth and resonance but is marred by its anecdotal character. Gilbert, a serious
scholar, would not dispute many o f Kinzer's assertions but takes the analysis several levels
deeper than Kinzer. Gilbert finds and masters the historical documents which ground
Sandinista policy and identity. He shows how the Sandinistas are organized and how they
react to crisis. Gilbert then provides detailed accounts o f how the Sandinista leadership
recognized its mistakes and changed policy over the years on the issues o f agrarian reform,
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the business community, the church and the Yankees. Gilbert finds evidence that the
Sandinistas were more than the simple control freaks as portrayed in many accounts and
made substantial and sincere attempts to meet the needs o f the rural and urban population,
albeit sometimes unsuccessfully.
I can not dispute Kinzer's and Gilbert's findings that perhaps a majority chafed under
FSLN leadership. There is widespread evidence, on an international scale, o f discontent
and revulsion with a Marxist approach to governance. Historically and politically
Marxism has M ed. The crucial elements o f its M ure perhaps lie in its conceptions o f
democracy and participation.
The FSLN's conception o f democracy emphasizes results over process and popular
"participation” over electoral institutions. Underlying and complexifying this is die party's
vanguard status and its historic role o f guiding the masses to the promised land. From the
view o f the vanguard, a party that represents the majority is, by definition, democratic.
One that does not is undemocratic, even if it honestly maintains formal democratic
procedures. Soon after gaining power in 1980, a Sandinista communique attacked
"democratism" as a "liberal bourgeois ideology" that stresses abstract freedoms without
regard to real content in a class society. Peasants, under Somoza, were deprived o f their
land and so were free to sell their labor. Capital, the communique goes on to say, was free
to exploit the people any way it wished. Culture and information was freely manipulated
to preserve the status quo. Somoza was free to crush any movement that defended the
people. The Sandinistas accused their conservative opponents o f reducing democracy to
elections. Somoza, they remind listeners, regularly held elections in Nicaragua and
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regularly won. To these "corrupted" models o f democracy the Sandinistas oppose the
concept o f popular participation.
Democracy means "PARTICIPATION o f the people" in the entire range o f the
nation's affairs. The broader the participation, the greater the democracy. Further,
democracy neither begins nor ends with elections. "True democracy" starts in the
economic order, as social inequalities decline and the living standards o f workers and
peasants rise. The point b that the previously silenced voice would be given a role in the
shaping o f national policy.
The concept o f participation remained ill defined for the Sandinistas. The FSLN
created many channels for citizen participation in the revolution, including Sandinista mass
organizations and unions, political rallies and "face-the-people" meetings, at which citizens
are invited to question leaders about governmental policies. The FSLN does not clearly
distinguish participation from political mobilization. If the two are equated then
participation b reduced to an activity whereby the party communicates its ideas to the
people and the people either support or decline to support the FSLN. The assumption b
that all worthy participation b for the revolutionary cause and not an alternative political
party.
Kinzer, in Blood o f Brothers, detaib the political oppression inside Nicaragua during
the Sandinistas tenure.60 Freedom o f the press was sporadic, and numerous political
groups were marginalized through various means.61 It was not until 1990 that mayors and
regional council membership were actually voted into office, rather than appointed by the
FSLN. It b , however, important to note that the Sandinistas did direct considerable funds
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toward social programs for the poor and did not routinely slaughter their own people like
the death squad governments o f "fledgling democracies" in El Salvador and Guatemala.
The FSLN has long conceived o f its task in terms o f a two-stage revolution, typically
denoted as national and social liberation. The role o f the vanguard party is key. The twostage revolution is most explicitly described in the 1977 Platform and subsequently
reaffirmed in many speeches and party documents.62 The Platform emphasizes the role o f
the vanguard in linking the two phases:

Breaking the chains o f imperialist rule determines our national liberation process.
Breaking the yoke o f oppression and exploitation o f the reactionary Nicaraguan
classes determines our social revolution process. The two historic undertakings
will be inseparably linked with the existence o f a solid vanguard and a MarxistLeninist cause to guide the process... Our country’s backwardness and its
dependent capitalist system determine the objective need to complete the
revolutionary democratic state in order to assure the structural and superstructural
(material and ideological) bases for the revolutionary process toward socialism.63

The key objective o f the new government would be “the neutralization o f potential internal
and external enemies while we accumulate the military and mass forces that guarantee the
continuity o f our (revolutionary) process.”64 Concretely, this meant the creation o f a new,
revolutionary army committed to the FSLN and the political mobilization o f the
population through a large network o f Sandinista mass organizations.65 While this was
happening, the new government would carry out a social reform program to benefit the
masses and win popular support. And it would begin to reorient the national economy,
increasing state control, reducing foreign dependency, and encouraging growth.66

34

The mass organization, the new education system, and even the army were to
contribute to the development o f a new political consciousness in the people, a critical
prerequisite for the transformation o f society.67 One purpose o f the new education system
was to “strip the system o f exploitation naked before the eyes o f the exploited and give
them an instrument that will convert them into the actual subjects (agents) o f their own
history.”68 Both within the military and without, officers and soldiers should be
“transmitters o f (political) consciousness.”69
The political and economic range o f the first phase program suggests that the FSLN
expected to control the new regime. But Sandinista theory did not anticipate a MarxistLeninist dictatorship o f the proletariat, rather the new government would be a broad based
“popular democratic” regime. The continuing economic and political participation o f the
progressive bourgeoisie was especially important if two critical goals o f the first phase
program were to be attained - successfully resisting imperialism and building the material
bases for a new society. The Sandinistas planned to maintain “hegemony” in the new
government. The bourgeoisie were to be producers without political power. There was a
definite tension between the party’s plans for a broad based regime and its notions o f its
own role and class commitments.
“Socialism” is the goal o f the second phase o f the revolution, according to the
repeated assertions o f party documents and spokesmen. “Our great objective”, wrote
Fonseca in 1969, “is socialism.”70 Two key internal documents, the 1917,Platform and
the 1979 re-unification accord among Sandinista factions also take “socialism” as the final
aim o f the revolution.71 In numerous speeches delivered from 1983 to 1986 before
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sympathetic audiences, National Directorate members reaffirmed this article o f Sandinista
faith.72
There appeared to be socialist consensus among leaders o f the FSLN. However, the
Sandinistas never clearly explained what they meant when they talked o f socialism.
Perhaps the following passage from a party document published in 1980 was meant as a
definition:
The objectives o f the Revolution are none other than to fight until it guarantees the
well being o f all the workers. Instead o f the shack, decent and humane housing.
Replace the floor with a bed to which the producer o f social wealth has a rig h t...
this is the Sandinismo whose potential is contained in the economic and social
project o f the people, that today has its concentrated expression in the popular
uses o f the profits that the APP (People’s Property Area, the state sector) is
beginning to produce.73

Here the state sector (most significantly the large agro-export enterprises seized from
Somoza and his associates) is seen as containing the germ o f a new socialist society which
will provide the worker a decent material standard o f life.
Many Sandinistas were drawn into a vision o f the future that promised more than
material justice. Their brand o f socialism is built around the concept o f the “new man”
who has overcome the self-serving values promoted by capitalism. In a 1979 speech,
party member Carlos Tunnermann, then Minister o f Education, observed:

The new Nicaragua also needs a new man who has stripped himself o f selfishness
and egotism, who places social interests before individual interests.... The
individual (new man) is most fulfilled when he works within the collectivity.74

This vision seems to appeal most to Sandinistas whose beliefs are rooted in a radicalized
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Christianity. The most explicit Sandinista endorsement o f this concept is a 1983
government document establishing national education policy. The document describes
formation o f the new man as the objective o f Nicaraguan schools. The new man, product
o f a “new education” will be patriotic, committed to the interests o f the masses, anti
imperialist, internationalist, the enemy o f exploitation, racism and oppression. He will be
disciplined, creative, cooperative, hard working, fraternal, modest, self-sacrificing, and
persuaded that “individual interests should coincide with social interests.”75 He would be
ready to defend the nation and the revolution. See Spot Run and The Cat in the Hat are
long gone, so to speak.
Not all Sandinistas bought into the concept o f the new man. Humberto Ortega,
Head o f the Armed Forces, offered a vision o f the future in a 1981 speech to army
officers. He stressed ham and television sets.
(We want to) escape underdevelopment and create wealth so that the people will
be happy and not just further socialize our poverty. We want to see the day when
all our people can eat ham and they can have television sets and take vacations.
That’s what we want. We’re not going to promote a mentality that says we should
live like nuns or under socialism with a Christian character.76
This is perhaps a crude articulation o f a socialist vision. Adequate nutrition and wages, a
paid vacation and television in every home. There is little indication that Sandinistas
agreed about what socialism meant or how and when it might be achieved in Nicaragua.
Ideas about what socialism will be or should be in Nicaragua were still diffuse and not
very clear. This again shows that socialism is admittedly stronger in its critique of
capitalism than in its design o f a coherent alternative.
In summary,
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the central argument o f Sandinismo is this: The historical scenario o f Marx’s
Communist Manifesto is essentially correct, but the historical development o f
Nicaraguan society has been decided by imperialism. Imperialist domination o f
Nicaragua has meant a dependent economy, an underdeveloped state, an
incipient proletariat and a bourgeoisie incapable o f playing its historic role.
Sandinista theory puts the historical train back on track by broadening the
definition o f the class basis o f revolution and emphasizing the vanguard role o f
the revolutionary party.77
The distorted and immature nature ofNicaraguan society required a two-stage revolution.
This would be a gradual transition from the programs o f national liberation toward a
socialist society through a complicated process o f historical change. The vanguard party
will patriotically guide the people it leads through history in the making.
Once the FSLN established itself as the primary and really only significant party in
power, it followed through on many o f these theoretical principles. This created immense
concern, conflict, and crisis within Nicaragua. The business owners, for good reasons,
saw the FSLN as a threat to the future o f private enterprise and private property. What the
bourgeoisie regarded as a right, the Sandinistas saw as a privilege, subject to social
control
In late 1983, government and private economists informally estimated private
participation in the economy at 55 to 60 percent o f the GNP.78 But both business
representatives and Sandinistas officials recognized that such figures overestimated the
position o f private enterprise in the mired economy.79 Government regulation had curbed
managerial freedom to set prices, lower or raise wages, fire workers, buy raw materials,
redeploy capital, obtain credit, or buy foreign exchange.80 By that time, the government
owned and controlled all banking and foreign exchanges within Nicaragua. Private

investment was shrinking. Most new investment was being made by the government.
Government strongly supported many industries but still threatened to eliminate ownership
and management o f these same enterprises.81 Illegal or arbitrary confiscation o f private
property and the elimination o f court appeals caused severe distress throughout the private
sector.82 Clearly, the FSLN wanted business to accede to the interests and economic
policies o f the state. Similar problems occurred in the religious affairs o f Nicaragua. The
FSLN and the official Catholic Church regarded each other with deep suspicion from the
beginning o f the revolution. When the FSLN moved to consolidate its power, the church
hierarchy sided with the bourgeoisie, as it had done for many decades. The churchrevolution conflict escalated throughout the Sandinistas tenure.
Nonetheless, the Sandinistas did decisively win the 1984 elections. The FSLN did
not think much o f elections. “Neither bullets nor ballots will defeat this revolutionary
power, this Sandinista power, this popular power!” said Daniel Ortega in 1983. Arturo
Cruz was the leading opposition candidate in 1984. However, business and contra
supporters ultimately did not officially field a candidate for the 1984 elections under U.S.
pressure.83 Pre-election maneuvering completed the political transformation o f the middle
bourgeoisie. Wartime ally o f the Sandinistas and partner in the national unity government,
the middle bourgeoisie had become the core o f the domestic political opposition and
finally the political wing o f the contra movement.84
Even in the face o f all these difficulties and flaws, it is necessary to show in more
detail how the FSLN changed Nicaragua and opened up society strongly in favor o f social
justice. The revolutionary upsurge o f the 1980s threw into action a wide variety o f social
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groups that in previous decades had lacked an identity o f their own, or whose identity had
been expressed in terms o f subordination to other actors: women, indigenous people,
residents o f marginal settlements, religious groups. The 1980s saw the decisive advance
o f women’s organizations and movements, o f poor neighborhoods, o f human rights
defense groups, etc. A civil society that until then had been marked by fragmentation and
apparent passivity went through an explosive awakening.
The relationships between these new expressions o f social discontent and the
revolutionary organizations ran the gamut from subordination, through various degrees o f
autonomy and coordination, to outright antagonism. In Nicaragua, during the stage of
struggle against the dictatorship but even more so during the decade o f Sandinista
government, the new social and labor organizations o f the central and Pacific regions
tended to accept strategic and operational subordination to the Sandinista Front and the
state, while the ethnic groups o f the Atlantic coast struck up a quick and violent
antagonism with the revolutionary regime.85
Unions grew in strength and numbers. However, union demands and labor issues
often had to take a back seat to politics and military struggle. The priority o f the political
over the strictly labor related was especially stark in Nicaragua; the Sandinistas’ multi
class “national unity” strategy, and later economic crisis, reinforced the tendency to turn
the labor movement into an arm o f the revolutionary state, more active in the
implementing o f overall policy than in promoting the immediate interests o f its affiliates.86
Labor contracts became more common, but as the contra war intensified specific labor
demands were set aside in favor o f an emphasis on discipline, service in militias and
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support for the military draft. The abdication o f a specific labor agenda reduced the
Sandinista unions’ prestige among the working class.87 In 1988 the Sandinista
government introduced a monetary adjustment strategy that further undermined workers’
standard o f living: a drastic reduction in real wages, a rise in unemployment rates and
further deterioration o f basic food supplies.88
Sixty percent o f Nicaragua’s arable land changed hands under Sandinista agrarian
reform, to the benefit o f two-thirds o f the country’s peasant families; the lands in the
hands o f the large landowners shrank by SO percent.89 At the same time, the fell in land
values, a result at first o f land reform and later o f the economic crisis, made it easy to
become a small to medium former at a relatively low cost. The Sandinista agrarian reform
distributed land to some 138,000 Nicaraguan families, about two thirds o f the to ta l90
Associative modes o f production emerged and spread along with inproved access to land.
Almost 30 percent o f agrarian reform lands in Nicaragua were under different kinds o f
cooperative production; in El Salvador, agrarian reform cooperatives received almost 40
percent o f the redistributed land.91
A permissive institutional climate in Nicaragua encouraged organization among
small and medium formers. By the end o f the decade the National Union o f Farmers and
Ranchers (UNAG) was the country’s most active social organization, in a society that
until well into the 1970s had been noted for its very low level o f peasant organization.
UNAG survived the change in government in 1990 and even has taken up the demands o f
peasants who had previously joined or collaborated with the contras.92
There are no figures on income distribution in Nicaragua, but some indirect
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indications suggest that, at least between 1980 and 1984, the combination o f agrarian
reform, expansion o f social services and growth o f subsidies to basic consumption favored
a relative improvement in the income position o f the popular sectors, a trend that was
reversed with the policy shift and the broad deterioration o f the economic picture after
1985.93 Throughout the zigzagging, the middle class urban groups that were most
integrated into public-sector agencies appear to have been in the best position to improve
their access to resources and income.
During the first half o f the decade, the Sandinista regime’s policies improved the
standard o f living o f the masses and penalized the most recalcitrant sectors o f the ruling
class; in the second half, government policy did little to maintain these advances and, in
the opinion o f many observers, actively worked toward their reversal.94 Social
deterioration has accelerated in recent years, and as o f 1992, almost 69 percent o f the
Nicaraguan population lived below the poverty line.95
The closing o f the cycle o f armed struggle and repression creates possibilities, as the
political systems are rearranged, for social and labor organizations to progressively
develop their bargaining power and political autonomy. These newly empowered
organizations can then negotiate with traditional actors in the political system - parties,
unions, bureaucracies - over policy and national projects so that they can be in charge o f
their own futures. Consequently, as we tally up the achievements o f these decades o f
revolution, counterrevolution, repression and crisis, we must consider factors like
consciousness, effectiveness and identity, and not just specific material achievements.
Even with all these changes and attempts to improve living conditions, and probably
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because o f them, two things happened, (1) The FSLN showed that it alone could not
successfully regulate both the economy and social justice, although their strong suit was
improving social justice, and subsequently (2) the FSLN was voted out o f power in 1990
and 1996.
For the FSLN, what began as a successful project to identify and overthrow an
exploiting capitalist class, ended with these same “classes” coming to power again in the
1990’s. Perhaps the Marxist political currency o f class warfare, which was believable in
1978, became dramatically less so by 1990 and 1996. The problem, for the FSLN, was
that at the beginning (i.e. post revolution 1979), the capitalists were at fault for everything
and nothing much else was wrong. Accordingly, the FSLN took an instrumental view of
technology; nothing is really wrong with technology except that it has been abused by the
capitalists. The M ed FSLN solution was to politically marginalize the privileges o f the
elite and attempt to redirect technology toward the common good. This was supposed to
be an achievable task as the state took control over education, health, foreign exchange,
labor unions, wage rates, certain industries and so forth, and the state, implicitly was
beneficent and wise. As shown above, there were many positive effects in this regard, but
the major and compelling negative was that there were no visible elements o f the device
paradigm present by 1990. The economy was a disaster and inflation was out o f control.
There were ideological changes, but the overall strategy o f central control o f the economy
was a M ure. Implicit is the assumption that people in Nicaragua want the device
paradigm. Effects o f the contra war, the U.S. economic embargo and other factors will be
examined in later chapters.

The social strategies o f the state to see elements o f the economy as machine-like
which could thus be owned and controlled through central planning was a M ure because
it misunderstands how the device paradigm works. In order for people to support you or
your political party you must give them a stake in the machinery and fruits o f the device
paradigm. This machinery is the largely invisible support system o f technological
infrastructure that supplies the infinite stream o f commodious devices. In this sense the
device paradigm requires a populace involved in the expansion o f technology in labor and
leisure. There has to be a reliable delivery system to supply labor and consumer goods to
the people. The socialist state was overly sure o f itself as the entity that could identify and
guide people’s aspirations and more importantly, their labor. In order for the device
paradigm to take hold each citizen must be engaged individually in its expansion and
entrenchment. Each person must have a stake in technology. This is, perhaps, too much
to ask in a postrevolutionary setting which had more diffuse goals in mind. The FSLN,
showing their true Marxist roots, tried to control technology as if it were a giant machine,
with the FSLN as the brains and guidance system. The technological infrastructure, which
the FSLN so desperately needed to control, fell into disrepair, and evidenced again, the
failure o f central planning, five year plans, and so forth.
The FSLN allowed and supported the conditions for political growth and social
change. However, the splintering o f political consciousness was not anticipated and was
in direct contradiction to the FSLN’s project to unify political consciousness. Groups
chafed under FSLN control. It was hard to know in advance that this would happen after
the revolution. It is plausible, a priori, that central control o f the economy could have

worked. However, by the time the Sandinistas attempted this undertaking many other
socialist countries had tried and M ed this approach. There simply is no bureaucracy in
the world smart enough to pull it off, so it was arrogant to think the FSLN would succeed.
In order for the machinery side o f the device paradigm to grow and thrive a significant
number o f people have to have a stake in its success by way o f private ownership. By
politically marginalizing the petite bourgeoisie the FSLN alienated the one group that
could have assisted them in planning and investment strategies. In order to transform the
country politically and economically on a national scale some form o f social capital is
necessary to see people through the difficult times. Social capital are shared social
convictions which are needed to carry people through from the external (worker) side o f
the device paradigm to the consumption side (internal). It proved very difficult just to
maintain employment levels, let alone dramatically raise the standard o f living. The
Sandinistas tried to create social capital with their mass organizations, unions and fiery
political leadership, but could not succeed in forging a strong abiding base o f support
which could generate the necessary social capital. The FSLN was well intentioned in
many areas o f social change, but national pride, sacrifice and anti-imperialism were not
enough. The success or M ure o f various socialist policies was perhaps radically
contingent on the specific conditions o f its applications. That socialism did not and
probably will not take hold in Nicaragua shows that material achievements are very
i

important and that the path to improvements to Nicaraguan society will largely be
determined by free market initiatives. Perhaps “imperialism” will not return to Nicaragua
in the same form as under Somoza (I-III), but surely the pursuit o f affluence will
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eventually come to Nicaragua. Nicaragua remains in the impoverished world o f things and
has yet to transition into the world o f devices.
Before the structure o f the Contra War is sketched out it is necessary to look back in
some detail at U.S. - Nicaraguan history. This glance into our historical rear view mirrors
can help explain the Nicaraguan attempts at socialism and the predictable U.S. response to
such attempts. The focus o f Chapter three is an analysis o f imperialism and foreign affairs
through the lens o f the device paradigm. Chapter four explains the structure and
consequences o f the Contra War and how it is a necessary outcome o f this ontology.

C hapter 3
Imperialism and the Device Paradigm

Imperialism is the bridge that spans the history o f U.S. - Central American relations.
It is necessary to discuss imperialism in order to understand the roots of revolution and
the future. In Chapter 2 imperialism was referred to as the economic and political power
o f the advanced capitalist countries, especially the United States. In this chapter the
historical dimensions and paradigmatic character o f imperialism will be examined.
The device paradigm typically characterizes how domestic affairs are tightly
patterned and organized. My premise in this chapter is that foreign affairs and foreign
economies can also be patterned according to the device paradigm issuing in a “policy
device,” and simultaneously organized according to the wishes of the ruling powers and
against the common good. The policy device is the way that imperialism is maintained.
Creation and implementation o f a policy device, on this scale, requires long term planning
and constant maintenance. Numerous governments, economic policies and military
strategies are necessary for imperialism to operate efficiently. When local conditions
change, new people are voted into office or wars break out, there are often sudden or
perhaps subtle changes in the arrangements o f neighboring countries. Imperialistic policies
therefore need constant monitoring and adjustments to keep them running smoothly, just
like the power supply or the water supply. In this sense they are similar to a device.
People who set the terms o f the policy device do not bear the burden o f the violent
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machinery o f the device; the former are internal elements o f the policy device and the
latter its external elements. The huge problem, obviously, is that we are talking about
forcing and convincing people on the machinery side o f the device that these arrangements
are reasonable and it is in their best interests to comply. Typically there is resistance and
some type o f intimidation, indoctrination or direct force is necessary to maintain the
machinery o f production in an imperialist setting. Workers have few rights and the
politicians, for a variety o f reasons, &il to improve conditions. Imperialism is based on
large-scale coercion; so in the example o f imperialism, the policy device is Mr from a
neutral policy where both sides benefit equally.
There are deep historical roots to imperialistic policies in Central America. One
would think that the effects o f such policies would, by now, be part o f the normal
conversation in America, but such is not the case. As the device paradigm has emerged in
America so has geopolitical ignorance. What is fascinating about U.S. imperialism is that
it can be cloaked in numerous rhetorics, politics and fears. Because o f the ignorance and
indifference o f the public, blatant imperialist policies can be dressed up and trotted out in
the name o f regional security, anti-communism or improved trade relations and investment
opportunities, with little domestic resistance. These policies are often very complex and
involve intergovernmental agreements, subsidies, loans and a military presence. The
machinery o f imperialism, like that o f a device, has its paradigmatic inaccessibility. It is
arranged and implemented silently by staff in Washington. It occurs on a large scale and
over such huge time periods that it appears normal, and is thus rendered nearly invisible on
the internal side of the divide.
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Internal to the U.S. there are numerous effects o f imperialism which primarily benefit
U.S. corporations and U.S. society. A steady flow o f cheap raw materials and
manufactured goods from Central America flow into the U.S. that are quickly internalized
into our economy. Our sea lanes and distribution networks are kept intact, free o f outside
influence, and U.S. political hegemony in the region is maintained. What I want to show
in the remainder o f this chapter is how and why this policy device, here called imperialism,
has worked so effectively over time. It is my argument that the overall system that
operates between the U.S. and Central America has characteristics o f a device. The policy
device does so by dividing people into an internal or external component. Where internal,
people become workers and consumers (United States); where external, they become an
exploitable resource (Nicaragua). Those assigned to the internal component o f the policy
device are expected to relentlessly pursue affluence. In this respect, imperialism strongly
favors affluence. The policy device modulates the flow o f capital and goods between the
external and internal components through implementing various types o f policies that I
mentioned. This appears to be a mechanistic, divisive and dehumanizing way o f
categorizing and placing people in the overall scheme o f things. The historical data will
show this to be the case.
People o f Central America assigned to the external side of this divide are cursed with
lifetimes o f poverty and struggle. Internal to a given Central American country there is
more assigning and dividing taking place. Typically the ruling oligarchy or military assign
themselves to be internal while the peasants and wage earners are designated external.
Being ontological in character, the device paradigm will pattern our relations with the non
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human world also. If the environment is designated external, as it usually is, then it can
be exploited and polluted at will. When the device paradigm takes hold in a country and
more and more people are designated as internal, technology has true liberating potential.
People are provided with decent educational options; roads and other infrastructure are
built, repaired and maintained, basic health services are provided, infant mortality drops
and the government begins to reinvest in its own people, rather than in the military. To
Americans, who have been on the internal side o f the paradigm for so long, these ideas are
just common sense and not even debatable. However, the history o f the region shows that
governments can fall which pursue such policies and it is only with extreme strength,
determination and often civil war that a people can begin the transition from the external
to the internal side o f the policy device. Sometimes elections alone can turn the tide, but
usually some type o f protracted social struggle is necessary.
The history o f the region shows that the U.S. will align itself with whatever powers
are necessary to maintain the divide. This position is softening a bit as the number of
countries involved in North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations
expands. However, NAFTA negotiations are usually with large vibrant economies like
Brazil or Chile. It remains to be seen if Nicaragua will involve itself in or benefit from
NAFTA. Nicaragua is a small, almost meaningless, economy compared to other more
prosperous countries. NAFTA is a formal invitation to the internal side o f the device
paradigm.
Control o f Central American geography and adjacent sea-lanes is vital for North
American "security.” Nearly two-thirds o f all United States trade and oil imports as well
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as many strategic materials depend on the Caribbean sea lanes bordered by the five Central
American countries.1 Washington DC is closer to Nicaragua than to Los Angeles.
Central America is tightly integrated into the United States political-economic system.
What is this "system," and how was it set up?
Central America is coming to the close o f a thirty-year period o f armed struggles.
Many revolutionary movements have come and gone in this period. The United States
countered these and prior revolutions with military force. Washington's recent policy in
Central America, including the contra war on Nicaragua, is historically consistent for two
reasons: North Americans have been staunchly antirevolutionary since Jefferson; and
United States power has been the dominant external, and internal, force against which
Central Americans have rebelled.2 The reason for the continual struggle between "the
Shark and the Sardines,” as former Guatemalan President Juan Jose Arevelo called it, lies
embedded in the history o f United States-Central American relations.3 These two themes,
the United States’ fear o f revolution and the way the United States system o f imperialism
ironically helped cause revolutions in Central America, form the core o f Walter LaFeber's
book Inevitable Revolutions.
Early in U.S. history we became conscious o f our powers, and o f our "right"
relationship with Central America. We understood ourselves to be the status quo power
in the region. Let me be clear that by "we" I mean Washington bureaucrats that made and
carried out policy with respect to Central America. These officials did not oppose radical
change in Central America because o f public pressure. Throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries the overwhelming majority o f Americans could not have located any o f
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the five Central American countries on a map, let alone ticked off the region's sins that
called for United States economic or military control. As I pointed out earlier, this
geopolitical ignorance is inexcusable and readily exploited by Washington.
In 1776, Jefferson provided the Western justification for revolution: a people can
"alter or abolish" any government that no longer derives its "Just powers from the consent
o f the governed."4 Within a decade after he wrote the Declaration, Jefferson himself
recognized that principles o f self-determination no longer necessarily served United States
interests. They even contradicted these interests because revolution in Latin America
would prevent the steady accumulation o f a United States controlled isthmus. On the
mountaintop at Monticello, in 1813, Jefferson was confident that "in whatever
governments they (Central American nations) end, they will be American governments, no
longer involved in the never-ceasing broils o f Europe. ...America has a hemisphere to
itself."5 America would marginalize European influence wherever it cropped up, and seek
to control the politics o f the region. Thus was struck the eternal contradiction in United
States foreign policy between the principle o f self-determination, which grounds our
constitution and whose value has been self-evident to the American mind, and the
continued and necessary expansion o f American power, whose value was also important
and evident to certain North Americans.6 In order to carry through with this
schizophrenic mythos America needed a master plan to achieve political stability in the
region.
Washington feared revolutions because, they reasoned, exhausted and unwary
revolutionary governments might be susceptible to political subversion, "the outside
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agitator." Revolution is unpredictable, irrational, not bound to the rules o f the game.
Revolutionary governments would resemble bose cannons on a sea-tossed ship and thus
could threaten "interests" that America has considered essential to its safety, namely, the
right to infuse the region with capitalism and technology, which it controlled, and to
extract the goods we wanted.7 In other words, the policy goal was to convert Central
America into a stable external element, part o f the background o f the device paradigm, to
provide the invisible resources necessary to supply the commodities North Americans
enjoy. Historically Central America was assigned the position o f external component.
A revolutionary government would seek changes unacceptable to U.S. long-term goals.
According to this schema, the populations o f Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama are considered to be in the U.S. sphere o f
influence, hence INSIDE. But it is exactly these others, who supposedly need protection
from the OUTSIDE influence, that have revolted against United States policy and
presence. What happened? Revolutionary peoples have seemingly denied the hegemony,
the jurisdiction o f the United States.
With a booming confidence in capitalism and the appropriations o f the colonies o f
Louisiana from Spain (1803) and Texas from Mexico (1848), a dread o f revolution and a
ferocious appetite for militaiy "solutions", the "System" was erected and mainstreamed.
The ultimate goal o f power relations between North and South was "stability" which
makes possible a technobgical appropriation o f resources and which provides a broad
base o f political support throughout the Isthmus. The United States has been, and still is,
riveted to plans which secure and enhance our control over Central American nations.
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Internal political battles directly threatened United States interests in the area. Since the
United States had long ago decided that this was "our hemisphere," the outcomes o f such
battles were crucial
In the 1870's and 1880’s, the British and French had to be kept out. In 1870 France
began building an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua. Yellow fever destroyed the
enterprise, but not before President Hayes warned France o f the dire consequences if it did
not stop.8 United States troops landed at least seven times, during the nineteenth century
in Panama, to ensure that the Canal Zone remained open and free from "rebellion."9
Britain was forced to return the Miskito coast to Nicaragua in 1895, thus conceding our
vital strategic interest in any isthmian canal. In each o f these examples, the United States
sought political and military control over a disputed area. After 1900, the enemy was
Germany. Only after WWII were these enemies replaced by the Soviet menace. Fencing
out, or containing communism, preserved the region for North American strategic
interests and profits. There must be eternal vigilance in perpetuating this divide. Military
mobilization is required.
Direct day-to-day control was not necessary or desirable. The United States desired
informed control over Central American nations, which they finally obtained through a
policy device that can be described as "neodependency." Dependency theory is a way of
looking at Latin American development as part o f an international system in which the
leading powers have used their economic strength to make Latin American development
dependent on, and subordinate to, the interests o f those leading powers.10
Neodependency has stunted Latin America's economic growth by forcing their economies
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to rely upon one or two export crops, such as bananas or coffee, or on minerals which are
shipped off to industrial nations for further transformation or direct consumption. These
few export crops make a healthy domestic economy impossible, according to the theory,
because their price depends on an international marketplace which the industrial powers,
not Central America alone, can control.11 Such export crops also take up land (and
concentrate it in the hands o f the few) that should be used for growing food for local diets.
Thus malnutrition, poverty, even starvation, grows with the profits o f the relatively few
producers o f the export crops.12
Dependency disfigures local politics as well. Key export crops are controlled by
foreign investors or local elites who depend on foreigners for capital markets and
protection. Foreign influences thus distort economic and political development without
taking direct political control o f the country. Dependency theory denies outright file
fallacy o f North American elites: that imperialism cloaked as investment and trade in
Central America will result in a more prosperous and stable Central America. To the
contrary, dependency theorists argue, aggressive application o f the policy device has been
pivotal in shaping those nations' histories until revolution appears to be the only
"instrument" capable o f breaking the hammerlock held by the local oligarchy and foreign
capitalists.13 Latin America prosperity has not, and probably cannot be compatible with a
policy device subordinate to United States economic and strategic interests. The policy
device may be on its way out with the end o f the cold war and the contra war, and the
beginning o f more socially beneficial conduits o f trade and investment from North
America.
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LaFeber, in Inevitable Revolutions, illustrates and documents the historical record of
how Central America became dependent on the United States. He acknowledges that
mere economic power does not explain how the United States gained such control over
the region. Other forms o f power, political and military, accompanied the economic. If
economic leverage proved incapable o f reversing trends that American elites feared (social
revolution), these same officials wasted no time in applying military force to exterminate
these threats. The United States has intervened frequently, with troops, administrative
support and covert operations, to ensure that the technological conduits o f dependency
remain intact. U.S warships occupied the waters o f the Gulf o f Fonseca in 1907, and
again in 1910. U.S. Marines were stationed in Nicaragua from 1912-1934 in support o f
various governments and policies. Augusto Cesar Sandino fought an air and ground
war with the U.S. marines from 1927-1934 before being assassinated by Somoza I in
1934. The U.S. created and forced the National Guard on Nicaragua, filling the political
void left by the Marines.14 In the 1930’s Somoza I dramatically strengthened the role and
powers o f the National Guard, as well as his own political power.
Nicaragua, during the 1960’s, was incredibly "stable" due to the ruthlessness o f the
Somoza brothers. Political opponents were either shot, tortured or outmaneuvered.
Kennedy's hopes for peaceful change were unrealistic. Political voices were often silenced
in the "dungeon o f the Presidential Palace where electrodes o f the infamous Little Machine
were attached to their genitals for long sessions o f torture."15 The United States embassy
was next to the President's palace, indicating the symbolic but real feet that the U.S.
ambassador was the second most important person in Nicaragua. In any event, during the
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Alliance for Progress, foreign aid skyrocketed.
Between 1961 and 1967, the Alliance authorized loans to Nicaragua totaling $50
million. The Inter-American Development Bank injected another $50 million. Private
enterprise did its part, as direct United States investment rose from $18 million to $75
million.16 The resulting economic growth was spectacular. The GNP grew 6.2%
annually, during the decade.17 However this level o f "prosperity" was experienced by only
an elite few. As Alliance dollars poured in, agricultural exports streamed out, and no one,
especially Washington officials, wanted to threaten "progress" by making the results more
equitable.18 Cotton and coffee were the primary exports.
Cotton grew in its importance and so made the economy more vulnerable to market
forces. It was devastating to the land and people, because the cotton boom evicted small
farmers from their grain-producing lands and issued in another wave o f technological
power over nature. Each cotton crop required numerous applications o f unregulated
pesticides. The agricultural labor force actually shrunk due to mechanized cotton pickers.
The country turned from a net exporter to a net importer o f staple grains during this
period.19 Those who could not find work in the cities tried to claim land for subsistence
forming so they could have food in their bellies. By the mid-sixties, squatters occupied
nearly 20% o f all farmland.20 Nicaraguans lost their capacity to feed themselves due to the
structure o f the Alliance. During the mid-sixties the National Sandinista Liberation Front
(FSLN) started to operate. They were especially strong in rural areas. The United States
responded to this "threat" by increasing military aid and training to Nicaragua. Somoza
already required all o f his officers to spend one year at the School o f the Americas in the
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Canal Zone for proper indoctrination and training. Somoza did everything that the United
States asked for.
Prior to the Sandinista Revolution o f 1979 the Nicaraguan economy was controlled
by mainly three groups, the Somoza family, Banco de America, and Banco
Nicaraguense.21 These groups, with the Somoza group having political hegemony,
secured for themselves the benefits o f the country’s role in international trade as well as by
their intimate relations with transnational corporations operating inside Nicaragua. This
was accomplished through their financial power and monopoly over the domestic trade
apparatus. They were able to build up a chain linking the small producers o f coffee,
cotton, bananas, gold, silver etc. to the international markets for these products.22 Since
the chain was monopolized, they were able to exploit the majority o f the workers by
forcing them to sell low to the banks that in turn sold high on the international market.
This system served two purposes: it reinforced and perpetuated the technological
and financial power o f the three groups while at the same time it contributed to the
political domination o f the majority by consolidating the hegemony o f a small oligarchy,
the point being that the technological apparatus o f foreign trade (an element o f the policy
device) is far from a neutral apparatus or instrument, but a way in which the ruling elites
can control and consolidate economic and political power. This trading system served to
control and consolidate the assignment o f who was to be internal (the traders and bankers)
and who external (workers) to the device. Further, the profits from foreign trade were
either sent abroad and invested, or used for the consumption o f luxury items few could
afford. In both cases, foreign trade earnings generated by the laboring people were not
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applied toward the economic, social, or ecological development o f Nicaragua. These
trade groups were both the filter and the bridge between the U.S. and Central America.
The U.S. got the comfortable commodities; Nicaragua got the violence o f the policy
device.
Perhaps the most dangerous and lasting outcome o f the Somoza dynasty was the full
transformation ofNicaragua into a perpetual external component o f the regional economy.
As indicated in the last chapter, the FSLN saw the exploitation occurring due to trade
arrangements and quickly moved to nationalize the banking system, foreign exchange and
numerous industries, thereby creating a just new foreign exchange system. The FSLN was
able to bring about some social gains 1980-1985, however the vast majority o f the
population continued to register as externals locked in poverty. Nicaragua has yet to
escape the neodependency syndrome through investment and a diversified economy. In
feet, the war and debt crisis o f the 1980’s has imposed harsh realities on Central America
in the 1990’s.
Due to the collapse o f regional economies in the 1980’s, governments could not
generate the foreign exchange needed to pay their international debts or stimulate growth.
In general, to obtain further international credit, governments are obligated to follow a
combination o f macroeconomic policies prescribed by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank and the U.S. government. When they do, their debt payments are
rescheduled and new loans are granted called “structural adjustment loans.”23 Countries
are forced to choose from the structural adjustment menu o f austerity measures, tax
reform, monetary policies, export promotion and foreign investment. Unfortunately, the
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social effects o f structural adjustment fall most heavily on the shoulders of those who are
least able to sustain it, the poor. Services o f concern to the rich and powerful such as
major hospitals, prestige development projects and the military have not borne a
proportionate share o f the cuts in public spending.24 The services which have been most
radically pruned are health services, free primary education and food subsidies- the
services on which the poor are most dependent and which they have the least opportunity
to replace by private means. I consider anyone living below the poverty line to be
assigned as an external component o f the policy device. This continuing wrenching
poverty, malnutrition and disease show again how difficult and burdensome it is to
compete and operate in the global markets, and how improperly this burden M s on those
assigned to the external side o f the policy device. Many Nicaraguans now work in
assembly industries, known as “maquiladoras”, where low wages, government tax breaks
and a willingness to suspend labor and environmental regulations are common. The
Nicaraguan economy remains highly dependent on foreign capital. Thus the technological
ties o f dependency again remain intact and as strong as ever. The high hopes o f creating a
relative^ autonomous and just economy guided by a progressive caring government
probably seem like a distant dream. No matter what economic strategies are chosen, they
are all inherently political because they involve issues o f power and choices about the
distribution o f resources in society and the world. Politics is subservient to technology.
The policy device, which assigns people to external or internal status, seems to survive
intact, independent o f political trends. Even where the free play o f market forces is
demonstrably counter to the public interest, structural adjustment policies prevent the
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government from strongly intervening. In conjunction with severe structural adjustment
programs, the U.S. government has promoted a laissez-faire development scheme that
stresses free trade, deregulation and privatization. These have become additional
conditions that Central America nations have had to meet in order to get economic
assistance from their traditionally most important source - the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). Based on the exaggerated free market doctrines o f
some conservative economists, this “neoliberal” development scheme emphasizes
relinquishing government authority and completely “liberalizing” or opening up domestic
economies to foreign investment, then integrating them into a world economy in which
global markets dictate a country’s economic future without any provision for local control,
protection, or regulation.25 The U.S. has yet to reciprocate completely and open up its
own markets to all Central American and Caribbean exports. Instead it has provided
special access to “non-traditional” exports such as maquilla-assembled clothing and winter
vegetables. There are many substantive critiques o f these types o f programs, most o f
which are critical.26 Many alternative models o f development have been suggested,
primarily by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Sustained progress in Central
America will depend on governments and markets working in intelligent partnership with
each other.
Assigning people to categories is fundamentally an ontological task. It has been
called exploitation, oppression, imperialism, sexism, racism or other terms, but the
significant event is ontological The Being o f the person is compressed and ordered
against their will. While not exactly slavery, the lack o f respect for people’s feelings,

rights and aspirations can easily allow a lesser ontological designation into the external
category. In the case o f slavery no notion o f equal ontological or legal status is possible;
people are property outright and can be bought and sold like cattle. Slavery is an extreme
case, but I am sure many Central Americans thought o f themselves as slaves to this system
they had no control over. The device paradigm is so enticing and attractive because is
promises an end to the toil, misery and ignorance o f being on the external side of the
policy device. What I have shown is that historically, the vast majority o f Central
Americans had no knowledge o f the device paradigm because o f their long-standing status
as external components o f an imperialistic policy device. The transition to becoming
affluent enough to be a consumer (internal) comes only after long battles and the
destruction o f many forms o f labor that only exist on the external side o f the divide. This
takes years o f persistence and cultural change to adapt a culture to the device paradigm.
As indicated in the last chapter, some form o f social capital is required to see people
through this difficult transition. For many countries, including Nicaragua unfortunately,
this transition may never come. Prior to assigning, dividing, and patterning a society
according to the device paradigm many assumptions have already been internalized. It is
these philosophical assumptions that are examined in the following section on the ontology
o f technology.
The substantive theory o f technology argues that technology constitutes a new type
o f cultural system that restructures the social world as an object o f control. The device
paradigm modifies the substantive theory o f technology in that it describes how
technology transforms and deeply patterns everyday life and foreign affairs on the basis of
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human decisions or agreements. In forming and choosing to build a culture along the lines
o f the device paradigm we are not only choosing to use machines but are allowing many
profound cultural choices. Technology, in the form o f the policy device, takes on more
than a role o f mere means but becomes an environment and way o f life with a specific
form and function; this is its substantive impact. While a machine may seem neutral, (it
can be designed to do this or that), the web o f human activities and ecological cycles
surrounding the machine and its support structure show technology as something that can
not be easily put into a separate compartment. Today there are prodigious volumes of
rules regulating the integration o f the machine into the social fabric, thus entrenching more
and more the rule o f the device paradigm. Technology can become safer, cleaner and more
efficient by design, as it is regulated. Any obstacle to technology can be quickly
dispatched through further research and development. The technocratic outlook creates a
single-minded unambiguous view o f progress, o f problem-solving and social norms.
What Martin Heidegger did was uncover the primordial strength o f this approach
and illustrate its universal appeal and brute power, cogently and philosophically. He did
this, not without flaws by outlining how the technological restructuring o f society stems
from the degradation o f humans and Being to the level o f mere objects. While I
acknowledge that the history o f western metaphysics has a substantial role in development
o f technology, human choice always played an equally important role. I believe that
technology will continue on its course but will not culminate in the complete subjugation
o f humanity. Human beings can and will learn how to limit and attenuate the worst
influences o f the ontology o f technology. Human intelligence is needed to operate and
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maintain technology, so human conscience can always assert itself. Notions o f “ought,”
freedom, human rights, o f moral deliberation are always and ever opea This aspect, the
ethical, is minimized by Heidegger. However, Heidegger’s insights are valued because he
shows how deeply entrenched the problems are. War is not an inevitable outcome o f
technology. This is exceedingly difficult to believe given the carnage o f the twentieth
century, and the absolute possibility o f nuclear annihilatioa
Heidegger correctly saw how technology would radically “en-frame” or limit social
possibilities. The social structures supporting technology appear to be beyond any direct
control. Nonetheless, determinate existence in a technological world, I believe, allows for
human choice. Technology rips anything from its context and tries to “de-world” it,
rendering it a lifeless object. What humans can bring to this process o f “de-worlding” is
social mediation, the democratic process, so that the natural and social origins o f problems
can be traced. The contra war illustrates the failure o f America to see itself as the origin
o f war. The extremely easy attitude o f simply allowing a war to progress without
bothering to care, without “re-worlding” this gigantic machine describes elements o f the
device paradigm.
Neodependency theory presupposes a technological appropriation o f the world.
The ultimate goal o f United States policy in Central America is to very slowly transform
workers into consumers, then aquaint them via television with commodities they can
afford. There is intense pressure on Nicaragua to accept its destiny as another satellite of
American technology. With this acceptance comes the entire ontology o f technology.
The device paradigm is immanent. Since American technology has been at work in the
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region since the 1800's, this reality of a technologically specified society along the lines of
the device paradigm is not a foreign idea or concept to Central Americans. In feet, most
o f them would probably desire a more fully entrenched technological society. In Central
America, technology in the form of the violent machinery o f the external side o f the device
paradigm, exacerbates social problems since, as I have already shown, the levers of the
machinery lie in the hands o f a powerful oligarchichal-military elite, and mainly this class
o f people benefits from the system. Regular people service the machinery by working for
the oligarchies as laborers, pickers, ranchers, etc., and most do not even have this much
opportunity.
Built into the device paradigm, and thus the policy device, is an ontology o f
technology. Martin Heidegger has clarified this ontology in his essay “The Question
Concerning Technology.” What Heidegger does in this essay is explode the mythos o f
technology as mere means to an end and show that technology is a way o f revealing, o f
truth. Heidegger uncovers the deep roots o f the modem age. He shows that technology
infiltrates human existence and human knowing at a level more intimate than anything
humans could create. This transformation o f the human fundamentally distorts human
actions mid aspirations. Machines can run amok and create disastrous situations. The
transformative power o f technology manifests itself not only in its explosive productivity
but also in the way it normalizes human thinking. For Heidegger modem technology is a
revealing that challenges nature to yield energy that can be stored ami transmitted. What
does Heidegger mean by das Entbergen, the revealing?
The verb entbergen (to reveal) ami the noun Entbergung (revealing) are unique to
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Heidegger.27 Entbergen and Entbergung are formed from the verb bergen and the verbal
prefix ent-. Bergen means to rescue, to secure, to harbor, to conceal. Ent- is used to
connote a change from an existing condition; it can mean "forth" or "out" or can mean a
change that is the negating o f a former condition. Entbergen connotes an opening out
from protective concealing, a harboring forth. The Greeks used the word aletheia for
revealing. Romans translate this with veritas, which we refer to as "truth." What
Heidegger is after is a decisive, cogent analysis o f technology as a way o f revealing reality,
o f opening up the "essence" o f technology into full view.
"Technology” stems from the Greek technikon, which belongs to techne. Techne
refers to artistic and poetic activity, it belongs to the process o f "bringing into appearance
and imagery," a way o f bringing-forth, or poiesis. Physis also, the arising o f something
out o f itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. What comes from out o f unconcealment, or
presences by means o f physis is poiesis "in the highest sense."28 The bursting open o f a
seed pod, the cry o f a newborn baby, "the bursting o f a flower in bloom," an earthquake,
are all spontaneous eruptions, examples o f bringing-forth, poiesis from inside itself en
heautoi. What is brought forth by the artist or craftsperson by way o f techne, in contrast,
involves the play o f the fourfold modes o f occasioning, (the four causes) which together
bring-forth the work o f art. Techne, for the Greeks, was closely linked to espisteme which
means knowing "in the widest sense." To know, is to be at home in something, to
understand it, to be expert in it. Such knowing provides the occasion for "an opening up"
and as such is a revealing.
Heidegger begins his inquiry with the four Aristotelian causes: (1) causa materialis
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the matter out o f which things are made; (2) causa formalism the form or shape into which
the material enters; (3) causa Jinalis, the end that bounds and circumscribes the full realm
o f the thing that is being made, that which bounds or completes, in this sense, is typically
called in Greek telos, which is usually translated as "aim" or "purpose"; (4) causa
efficiens, the person responsible for integrating, or bringing about, the actual finished
thing. The four causes are all "co-responsible" in the bringing-forth o f the artwork, house,
ship or sword. Each o f the four causes, in this Greek sense, is responsible for bringing
something into appearance; Heidegger, calls this Greek experience o f responsibility the
"occasioning" o r aitia, the "essence" o f causality as the Greeks thought i t 29 Occasioning
in this sense takes on a much richer and complex meaning than that o f merely signifying
that an event took place.
With the onset o f modem science, the "occasioning" o f the fourfold causality has
been stripped down to a strict interpretation as instrumental rationality. Likewise,
technology as a human activity, as a way o f positing the ends and procuring the means to
achieve them, has seemingly been reduced to something value-neutral and instrumental.
As such, technology is simply an extension of human capacities through neutral artifacts.
Armaments, roads and machines can thus be considered "value neutral". Technology, in
this view, is the conflation o f causa materialis and causa fm alis made subservient to
narrowly defined human needs and ends.
Technology as instrument necessitates a search for what or whom guides its
expansion. What values or politics guide technology? With regard to Central America, I
so for have shown that a policy device, organized in Washington, has historically assigned
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Central America to the status o f an external exploitable resource. According to the
socialist critique, the ultimate ends that technology serves is the welfare o f the ruling elite,
which controls the policy device through various means, and the exploitation o f the
working class and the environment; social progress would depend on manipulating
technology in the proper manner as means. Technology is something that the Sandinistas
"took" control over, but in so doing supposedly attached a deep humanity to it. This is the
socialist argument. Resources were often used locally, rather than exported Exports and
imports were minimized and many industries were nationalized. United States
multinationals either left or were urged to consider the new Sandinista labor and
environmental laws if they stayed on. Business wasnt the same anymore. The FSLN
attempted to control the technological substrata to feed more people, educate them and
keep them healthy. As shown in Chapter 2, this approach was partially wrong and thus
unsuccessful in regulating the economy, in spurring private investment and in establishing
social justice.
But prior to analyzing by whom or how instrumental technology is guided or
managed, technology has already transformed our perceptions o f what is real. The
revealing that rules in modem technology is characterized as a challenging,
Herausfordem. Herausfordem is composed o f the verb fordem which means to demand,
to summon or to challenge, and the adverbial prefixes her (hither) and aus (out).
Together Herausfordem means to challenge, to call forth or summon to action, to demand
positively, to provoke.30 Technology challenges or provokes "nature” (insert Nicaragua
for nature) to supply energy that can be extracted and stored. "Nature" comes under the
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sway o f a setting-in-order that sets upon, stellt, nature in order for it to yield energy.
Agriculture is United Fruit banana plantations guarded by the military. Stellen, in this
sense, is an aggressive "setting-upon" which is inherently a setting in place so as to supply.

This setting-upon that challenges forth the energies o f nature is an
expediting Fordem, and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and
exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning
toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum
yield at the minimum expense.31

The earth no longer "stands" before us but is "ordered to stand by, to be immediately at
hand."32 Whatever energy concealed in nature is unlocked, exposed and immediately
transformed. Genetic engineering is a decoding, an unlocking o f the mysteries o f hair
color, height, dexterity, etc., but it is also an "engineering," for its intentions are to re-code
and manipulate human fetuses, human potentials, for further ordering. The more
engineering that is accomplished the further and deeper the revealing entrenches itself.
Engineering research exposes its "own manifoldly interlocking paths"33 which are
immediately seized upon by business and the academy as yielding potential profit or
publication.
Whatever is on call for further ordering, like the Nicaraguan rainforest or the human
genome, has a certain way o f standing. Heidegger calls it the "standing-reserve."34 To be
a standing-reserve (resource) is to be forever on call, in place or standing by, available for
use as mere stock. Standing-reserve designates a way in which reality is present according
to the challenging demanded by the revealing o f technology. What is on standing-reserve
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is no longer something which stands in its own right but is part o f an ontology that already
has plans for its transformation, distribution and control.
For Heidegger, Western culture has been decisively claimed by this way o f
revealing. Technology controls how the "real shows itself or withdraws." As technology
is driven forward over every indigenous culture on earth, humans take part in the ordering
and controlling o f the other. This way o f appropriating reality which has claimed the
planet Heidegger calls Ge-stell, or enframing, the "essence" o f technology.35
The framework or enframing, includes modem science and the entire industrial
apparatus. Science entraps nature so as to exhibit it as a calculable coherence o f forces in
advance. Research orders experiments to be performed precisely for the purpose o f
asking, and verifying, how nature reveals itself when set up in this way.36 Engineers
design apparatus, which exploit scientific findings. These findings create the possibility o f
new devices. Market forces distribute devices for consumption to the masses at maximum
profit. In socialist countries the state takes over planning and distribution; the underlying
ontology is the same.
“The way o f unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human
handiwork.”37 When nature reveals itself according to the enframing, the person has been
claimed by a way o f revealing that challenges the person to approach, and appropriate,
nature as an object o f research. Nature as real, becomes standing-reserve, due to the way
in which it shows itself. The enframing is a gathering-upon, which challenges us to reveal
the real in the mode o f ordering. Technological activity, such as building dams,
assembling engines and so forth is a response to the challenging forth o f the enframing.
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All o f nature and humanity must be managed. A group may think they are simply
transforming neutral material in a technical fashion as means to an end. Prior to this
physical transformation o f nature into object and energy, the enframing, the controlling
way o f revealing the real has claimed the group.
For Heidegger, where the enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense,
extreme danger-the danger being that the enframing will blot out or displace all other
forms o f truth, o f revealing, o f being claimed. All o f technology, for Heidegger, is a
danger. There are two crucial kinds o f danger within technology. The “external” dangers
o f disease and starvation for those designated as external, and the “internal” danger o f
moral callousness, for the internal. Assigning people to the external or assigning oneself
to the internal elements o f the policy device is inherently injurious because either assigning
Mis to allow for freedom o f allowing a group to organize itself and its relations with
nature appropriately. Where the enframing reigns, nature and people are resources first,
and beautiful and insightful only after much deliberate reflection. The stability and global
spread o f the device paradigm is a monumental social indicator o f how deeply the
enframing has been internalized. Without the enframing, the device paradigm, in either its
external or internal component, would be unintelligible, unimaginable. The enframing, to
the contrary, creates a rich field o f possibility. In this century, with respect to Central
America, this field o f possibility took the form o f exploitation and imperialism.
Indifference is an attitude in which the other simply does not matter and his or her
suffering and joys are o f absolutely no consequence. By assigning Nicaragua to the role o f
external resource, Nicaragua is disregarded as an equal. Indifference corresponds to the
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internal side o f the device paradigm. The ontological status of external resource allows
for indifference. By introverting all attention upon projects that benefit U.S. interests
alone, the presence o f others is reduced to that o f mere objects. The unique existence o f
the other is subordinated, minimized and objectified to the far greater concern o f
maintaining power relations and profit.
Since Thomas Jefferson, the U.S. has never given up on its desire to indirectly
control the politics o f Central America. In this sense the U.S. remains attached to Central
America. On the other hand, the appropriation o f Nicaragua as an external resource is
inauthentic and thus allows for deep cultural indifference. The policy device, in this
instance, is organized violence. The structure o f the policy device allows those on the
internal side o f the device to reap the benefits o f the device paradigm, they get a politics
devoted to affluence. Individuals on the internal side o f the device are not held
accountable, but should be, for the organized violence o f the external side o f the device.
Linkages between the two exist but are often legally sanctioned. In this manner the policy
device desensitizes people on the internal side; it makes no demands to think morally but
provides an infinite array o f commodious devices that are quickly and easily consumed.
When the Sandinistas took power from Somoza in 1979, the U.S. reacted swiftly
and violently. When people have historically been treated as objects, their manipulation
and murder in times o f war is easy. The following chapter shows how making people into
an external resource o f the device paradigm leads to violence, terror and war. Conflict
can escalate to such an extent that one side or the other is decimated beyond repair. In
this extreme situation war is incompatible with the smooth running o f the technological
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machinery. Since the U.S. desires to continue, in the long run, the technological
appropriation o f Nicaragua, the contra war was not carried to out to a cataclysmic
extreme. Congressional oversight and votes on the house floor indicate that there were
deep reservations, in certain quarters, about the direction and purpose o f the contra war.
The U.S. never invaded. However, the contra war was a disaster for Nicaragua, as the
following chapter will show.
Before I go on to the structure o f the contra war I need to comment on the policy
device and how it is distinguished from the device paradigm. The policy device divides
and assigns people according to ontological status. The policy device is permeated by
local and regional politics and assigns people often for strategic or national interests. The
structure and functions o f a policy device indicates its philosophical and ontological
assumptions. The political frameworks o f the players who forge a policy device are
critical A policy device is politically open in this sense. Alternative development models,
forms o f aid and advice will differ according to the politics o f the countries, which control
and participate in the device. For example, Sweden sent technicians to Nicaragua during
the contra war to help in agriculture and other areas. Wisconsin and Nicaragua are Sister
States and have ongoing positive relations. These are examples of humane policy
devices. Alternative conduits have always been present. It is just that the policy device I
described completely overwhelmed any small-scale direct material aid or cultural exchange
because o f its scope and economic power.
The device paradigm describes a complete form o f civilization. There is inequality
in the cultures devoted to the device paradigm but little disagreement as to what
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constitutes our aspirations as a people. Those on the lowest rungs o f society can see the
broad middle class and aspires to those standards. Development o f the device paradigm is
constrained by democratic processes, imperfect as they are. In cultures devoted to
affluence, over the long term, there is a slight inclination toward social justice, in order for
those designated internal to realize pieces o f the promise o f technology, and to grow in
numbers. The device paradigm is an entrenched and socially vibrant phenomenon strong
enough to undermine politics. The policy devices necessary to support the paradigm are
only constrained by regional geopolitics and are thus variable between humane and
oppressive, depending on the politics o f the sponsoring country. The oppressive policy
device o f imperialism is only one small, but important, element o f the U.S. device
paradigm.

The contra war is a logical extension o f imperialism and, it too had

characteristics o f a device.

Chapter 4

Internal and External Elements of the Contra W ar

As stated in Chapter 1, there is a basic structure to war. In war, the shared activity
is injuring, and the participants must work to out-injure each other. Both sides inflict
injuries. The side that inflicts greater injury faster will be the winner, or to say it another
way, the side that is more massively injured or believes itself to be so will be the loser.
The qualification “believes itself’ is an important one, for countries will differ in the level
o f injury that represents the borderline between tolerable and intolerable damage. Each
side begins the war by perceiving physical damage as acceptable and ideological and
territorial sacrifices as unacceptable. Through war each side tries to bring about in the
other the fundamental perceptual reversal - damage as unacceptable, and sacrifices or
ideological change as acceptable.1 The terms “out-injuring” or the phrase “each side
works to out injure the other” means “each side works to bring the other side to the
latter’s perceived level o f intolerable injury faster than it is itself brought to its own level
o f intolerable injury.”2 It is the activity of injuring that is the substantive and determining
act o f war. Strategy, policy initiatives, diplomacy, medical and logistical needs all
contribute to war and directly contribute to one side’s ability to out-injure the other side.
These activities, however ingenious and cunning they may be, do not describe the
determining activity of the contest. These support activities are all subsumed into massive,
intense feats o f out-injuring the other.
74
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The flow o f the United States funded arms and logistical/training support to
Nicaraguan armies has a long and colorful history. What was crucial and intelligent about
the Reagan administration’s strategy was that U.S. troops never engaged in battle directly.
The Reagan administration was able to get the better o f the enemy with little loss of
political capital. In other words, an extremely successful strategy is one in which the
decision is brought about without a battle. A slightly less successful strategy, still very
successful and what the Reagan administration actually did, is one in which the injuring
occurs in only one direction. On the battlefield of course there was two-directional
injuring. However, there were so many layers o f command, management, government,
and physical geography between our surrogate fighting force, the contras, and the U.S.
populace that in reality the contra war was one-directional in this sense. Only their side,
the Nicaraguan side, was injured.
The policy device that guided the contra war had discernible structures and
purposes. Initiatives against the Sandinistas were multifaceted, and matured and changed
over time and in response to congressional criticism; however the fact must not be
forgotten that injuring o f Nicaragua was the sole purpose of each facet. A device,
following Borgmann, once designed and in use, does not engage or even permit
engagement.3 On the external side (the receiving side), the contra war policy device
procured for the U.S. terror, political intimidation, destruction and death: violence against
people, violence against things and violence against ideology. On the internal side, the
policy device procured only information, press releases and some political drama
surrounding aid to the contras and the Iran-Contra hearings o f 1987. This suggests that
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engagement with the machinery o f foreign affairs is unintended, its actual workings are
rarely and reluctantly opened for public debate. It is interesting to note that the IranContra hearings focused on the illegalities o f the internal side of the policy device and not
the injuring which occurred in the external element.
There were two significant differences between the policy devices o f imperialism and
o f the contra war. Under imperialism, Somoza’s political and economic clout and the
Guardia were necessary, but not sufficient conditions, to create and maintain a
neodependent economy and an oppressed workforce. U.S. markets, U.S. military and
economic aid, and U.S. political guidance were also necessary for imperialistic policies to
flourish over time. Under imperialism there has to be a national government willing to act
in a broad but concerted fashion as the local wing o f the internal component o f the device
while also ensuring that the external component of the device was under control. With the
fall of Somoza and the dissolution o f the Guardia, the local national component of the
internal side o f the divide also seemingly vanished. The loss of the Guardia and its vast
network o f informers created a huge political void and much anxiety both within and
outside Nicaragua. Almost immediately, ex-Guardia regrouped in Honduras and began
planning to overthrow the new government. The contra war was an attempt to recreate a
new national component o f the internal side o f the policy device. Imperialism relies on the
maintenance o f historic centers o f power. The contras and their supporters were tapped
by the U.S. to re-assume that role. The Sandinistas were not allowed to be that power
base because o f their untested and dubious loyalty to the inhuman mechanisms o f a
neodependent state. The second crucial difference was that imperialism requires a routine
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and predictable, although cruel, method of extracting and trading goods and raw materials
for the purpose o f economic control whereas in the strategies of the contra war the
purpose was to radically disrupt the extraction and distribution of goods and raw
materials, and the movement of people, until a new regime could assume power. The
U.S. felt so strongly that the FSLN could not function as either their internal national
partner, or as a controllable external component, that only a multifaceted terror campaign
could set things right again.
There were five basic elements to the implementation o f the contra war, as far as one
can tell from the literature: (1) A contra fighting force was armed and trained and sent into
Nicaragua on a regular basis to fight Sandinista troops. (2) FSLN social programs and
infrastructure were targeted by the contras such as health clinics, cooperatives and
schools, and important bridges. (3) Civilians and Sandinista officials were assassinated,
threatened, kidnapped and tortured. (4) The Nicaraguan economy was disrupted by the
war, a U.S. embargo (1985-1990) and pressure on international lending agencies not to
extend credit to Nicaragua. (5) There was an ongoing “disinformation” campaign (i.e.
official lying) regarding Nicaragua. Contras were consistently referred to as “democrats,”
“the moral equivalents o f our founding fathers,” and “Freedom Fighters,” by Ronald
Reagan, in direct contradiction to their actual conduct in the field. These are examples of
renaming injuring, and thus rendering invisible, the true purpose o f war. Unfocussed
attacks on Nicaragua such as the mining of harbors and the strategic placement of
landmines in rural areas, along footpaths and in roads, also occurred. There were many
initiatives to subvert the Sandinistas, but most fall into these five broad categories. In its
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totality, the contra war was a terrorist attack on Nicaragua inflicted under U.S. guidance
and funding. It was clear, as determined by the world court and other third parties, that
most o f these activities were illegal and broke numerous national and international laws
and applicable laws o f war. Still, the U.S. pressed on.
Earlier I described war as an intense form of work focused on injuring the enemy.
Later on I spoke about war as a contest seeking ideological and political changes. The
contra war intimately contained both of these aspects and one more - the proxy fighting
force. The political changes sought through injury and contest took place only in the
external domain o f the policy device. Internal elements designed and waged war easily and
unobtrusively due to their political, historical and geographical status in the region. The
U.S., since it was operating a clandestine operation outside Nicaragua and the law, never
had to have its policies formally authorized by internal Nicaraguan political groups or the
Nicaraguan legislature. Components o f this policy device were thus freefloating,
untethered to moral or judicial constraint. Since local political approval was not necessary,
it was also unconnected, and therefore uncommitted, to any specific geographical region.
It had no popular political base in Nicaragua. Violence waged was calculated and
focused. To the recipients (external domain) it appeared random, irrational yet blatantly
politically motivated. In America, no injuring occurred directly, it was only reported. The
U.S. consolidated and focused its immense political, financial and military prowess to fight
a war few Americans believed in or understood. Their spear carrier was a proxy army
composed o f counterrevolutionaries, or contras, who not only cushioned the U.S. from
injury but added political legitimacy to the U.S. cause because the contra war could be
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portrayed as a “civil” war, largely motivated and controlled by internal political pressure
and not from without. There was political support for the contras within Nicaragua.
It is interesting to note that during the contra war Nicaragua openly embraced a
deluge o f aid from numerous governments and NGOs. In particular, members and staff
from American NGOs who worked in Nicaragua at the time were not merely tolerated,
but publicly welcomed. This shows that the FSLN itself could also assign and divide
according to the device paradigm. People, groups and governments that provided
empathy, or material, financial and administrative support to the people o f Nicaragua were
viewed as in solidarity with their struggle and thus designated as external. It was common
to hear Nicaraguans plead with visiting Americans to help stop the war. The FSLN, and
many Nicaraguans, instead o f blaming the visitors, divided American citizenry from its
own government and thus disburdened them from direct responsibility and guilt for U.S.
actions. There was no attempt to exact revenge on Americans. The old saw was: we like
you, but not your government. However, this neglects the deep connections between
people and their governments. Visiting Americans had the good fortune to transfer from
the war zones to America (external to internal element) with relative ease just as they
crossed the invisible boundary between work and leisure. Returning Americans who
spoke out against the contra war were often labeled as biased, soft, and politically naive.
Fellow internals, especially yuppies (this was the decade of greed and excess) were
incredulous at the protesters and simply wished them out existence. There was money to
be made, no time for reflection. Further, the U.S. government, for almost the entire war,
prohibited Sandinista officials and Nicaraguan cultural groups from visiting the U.S. to
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speak directly with politicians or citizens. Thus the voices o f the external element were
easily overwhelmed by the internal element which bombarded the press and public with
almost daily press releases, reports and sanctions from the bully pulpit of the highest office
in the land. Because o f their continued status as external components of the policy device
and their refusal to bend to U.S. demands, Nicaraguans were pummeled into submission
or in the words o f Ronald Reagan, forced to “cry uncle.”4
The Reagan administration justified its hostile policies toward the Sandinista
revolution with four claims: (1) that Nicaragua’s military buildup jeopardized the security
of its neighbors, (2) that the political regime the Sandinistas were creating was
undemocratic, (3) that Nicaragua was an ally of Cuba and the Soviet Union, and therefore,
a threat to the United States, and (4) that Nicaragua was actively supporting revolutionary
movements in neighboring countries.5
The first two were clearly pseudo-issues, after the fact rationalizations for American
policy. The Sandinista military, initially modest, grew in direct response to contra attacks
and remained, in the words o f a classified CIA report, “primarily defense oriented.”
Nicaragua has minimal capacity to project force outside its own borders. The U.S.
attitude toward the 1984 elections, in which the U.S. pressured Contra spokesman Arturo
Cruz to withdraw, suggested that the administration was more interested in defeating the
Sandinistas than in building democracy. The third and fourth issues form the real core of
U.S. concerns in Nicaragua and deserve closer examination.
The Sandinista had warm relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union since the
beginning o f the revolution. But the Contra policy and American efforts to isolate
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Nicaragua economically pushed the country into greater dependence on Soviet-bloc
military and economic aid. Initially, the Soviet Union and its East European allies became
Nicaragua’s arms suppliers because the U.S. pressured its own allies not to sell arms to
the Sandinistas. Pentagon data indicated that Soviet-bloc deliveries were relatively small
through 1981, but surged as the covert war escalated in 1982 and thereafter. In 1984, the
Soviet-bloc supplied $250 million in munitions to Nicaragua, up from only $5 million in
1979 and $7 million in 1980.6 There were 300 to 500 Soviet and Cuban military advisors
in the country in 1987, along with 700 non-military advisors.7 As Western development
credits were cut off, Soviet-bloc financing of the Nicaraguan economy expanded from 25
percent o f external financing in 1981 to 85 percent in 1984.®
Since the beginning o f the revolution the Cubans generously supported Sandinista
social programs. Cuba sent over 1,000 educators to help with the 1980 Literacy Crusade,
modeled on the 1961 Cuban experience.9 By 1982, there were about 2,000 Cuban
teachers in Nicaragua, many o f them working in remote areas and nearly 1,000 doctors,
nurses, and other medical personnel.10 Cuba built a 150-bed hospital in Managua and
provided advanced training on the island for Nicaraguan doctors in such areas as public
health. The Cubans also provided economic and technical aid in areas where they had
expertise, including road construction, fishing, mining, poultry rearing, and sugar
production. It must be made clear that there were limits to the Soviets’ and Cubans’
willingness to back the Sandinistas. Soviet oil flow was temporarily suspended in 1987.
The Soviets, Cubans, and Americans all understood that the Cubans and Soviets would
not come to Nicaragua’s defense in the event o f an American invasion.11

82

U.S. complaints about the growth of the Sandinista military and the Soviet-bloc
presence in Nicaragua is perhaps secondary to the U.S. concern about the Sandinistas
alleged “export” o f revolution to neighboring countries. The National Directorate’s
decision to support the Salvadoran rebel’s ill-fated January 1981 offensive was, in fact,
taken reluctantly and under extraordinary conditions.12 The Salvadorans approached the
Sandinista leadership for help in mid-1980 when the military and associated death squads
in their country were murdering hundreds o f people o f quite varied political complexions
every month. In March, Archbishop Oscar Romero o f San Salvador, who had denounced
the killings, was gunned down as he was saying Mass. In desperation, political moderates
were joining the armed resistance, and El Salvador seemed to be heading for the sort of
popular insurrection that had finally toppled the Somoza dictatorship. The Sandinistas had
received help from moderate governments in Costa Rica and Venezuela under similar
circumstances, but now the Nicaraguans were worried about compromising their relations
with the United States if they helped the Salvadoran insurrection.
After some hesitation, the National Directorate agreed to help, but several months
passed before the arms began to flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador in significant
quantities. The change came with the election o f Ronald Reagan in November 1980 on a
platform that suggested rolling back the revolutions in Nicaragua and elsewhere. At this
point, the Sandinistas felt they had little to lose and might enhance their own imperiled
security by helping to bring a friendly regime to power.
After the collapse o f the January 1981 offensive in El Salvador, Nicaraguan
assistance was apparently halted when the Sandinistas thought they had an understanding

with the Reagan administration about restarting U.S. aid. There is no evidence that the
flow o f arms later resumed. At the time, Salvadoran guerillas did not need outside
supplies to survive. The rebels relied largely on munitions captured or illegally purchased
from Salvadoran government sources.
All four issues outlined above were discussed openly and in high level diplomatic
talks between the U.S. and Nicaragua throughout the 1980’s. The fact is that the U.S.
throughout the contra war outright rejected all Nicaraguan peace proposals. The injuring
had to continue. Since Nicaragua was an external resource, and a socialist one at that, its
ideas were never given equal weight and consideration. Brutality and indifference to
brutality reigned.
The early contra war relied upon a three- sided arrangement, “La Tripartita.” The
U.S. supplied directions and money, Argentina provided training and cover, and Honduras
was the main base o f operations. Following the March 1981 Presidential finding on
Central America, State Department ambassador-at-large Vernon “Dick” Walters (later UN
Ambassador) was dispatched to negotiate agreements with the contras and the
Argentineans. Walters, a retired lieutenant general who speaks eight languages including
Spanish, has a long career in covert operations involving him in such affairs as the 1953
overthrow o f the Mossadegh government in Iran, the 1964 overthrow o f the Goulart
government in Brazil, and the 1973 overthrow of the Allende government in Chile.13
Walters personally negotiated the merger of the September 15th Legion and the
UDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Union) into a new organization called the Fuerza
Democratica Nigaraguense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force, or by its Spanish acronym,
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F.D.N.).14 At that time, the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small bands
operating along the Nicaragua-Honduras border. The largest and most deadly band was
the September 15th Legion. These bands were poorly equipped and unorganized. They
were not an effective fighting force. The UDN was a moderate group headed by Jose
Francisco “Chicano” Cardenal.
According to Edgar Chamorro, a contra official, Cardenal and the UDN initially
opposed any linkage with the guardsmen. The CIA and high-ranking U.S. officials
insisted on the merge with the Guardsmen. The UDN was well aware o f the crimes
committed by the Guardsmen against the Nicaraguan people while in the service of
President Somoza. However, the UDN recognized that without help from the U.S.
government, there was no chance of removing the Sandinistas from power. So the UDN
eventually acceded to the CIA and General Walters’ insistence that it join forces with the
Guardsmen. Walters himself arranged for all the bands to be incorporated into the
September 15th Legion and for the military government of Argentina to send several army
officers as advisors and trainers.15
Edgar Chamorro described the merger o f the September 15th Legion and the UDN:

....on August 10, 1981 it was accomplished ... at a meeting in Guatemala
City, Guatemala, where the formal documents were signed. The meeting
was arranged and the documents prepared by the CIA. The new
organization was called Fuenza Democratic Nicaraguense (Nicaraguan
Democratic Force) or, by its Spanish acronym F.D.N. It was to be headed
by a political junta consisting o f Cardenal, Arestides Sanchez (a politician
loyal to General Somoza and closely associated with Bermudez) and
Mariano Mendoza, formerly a labor leader in Nicaragua. The political
junta soon established itself in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, taking up residence
in a house rented for it by the CIA. Bermudez was assigned to head the
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military general staff and it too was based in Honduras. The name o f the
organization, the members o f the political junta, and the members of the
general staff were all chosen or approved by the CIA. Soon after the
merger, the FDN began to receive a substantial and steady flow of
financial, military, and other assistance from the CIA. Former National
Guardsmen who had sought exile in El Salvador, Guatemala, and the
United States were recruited to enlarge the military component of the
organization. They were offered regular salaries, the funds for which were
supplied by the CIA. Training was provided by Argentinean military
officers, two o f whom Col. Oswaldo Ribeiro and Col. Santiago Villejas I
got to know quite well. The Argentineans were paid by the CIA. A
special unit was created for sabotage, especially demolitions. It was
trained directly by CIA personnel at Lepaterique, near Tegucigalpa. Arms,
ammunitions, equipment, and food were supplied by the CIA. Our first
combat units were sent into Nicaragua territory in December 1981.16

A command structure was established with formal direction from the CIA. Funds and
expertise from prior covert actions were funneled into the contra cause. Reagan signed a
National Security Decision Directive on November 23, 1981 authorizing the CIA to
“Work with foreign governments as appropriate” to conduct political and “paramilitary”
operations “against (the) Cuban presence and Cuban-Sandinista support infrastructure in
Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.” 17 The CIA was allocated $19.95 million to
build a 500-man force in Honduras that would complement a 1,000-man force being
trained in Argentina.18 Washington reportedly paid Argentina $50 million to provide the
training.19
When presenting the finding to the Intelligence Committees, administration officials
emphasized arms interdiction. Casey said the United States was “buying in” to an existing
Argentine operation to train Nicaraguan exiles. By one account, “the impression left with
some members o f the Intelligence Committees was o f crack teams of commandos hitting
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arms caches, ammunition dumps, Cuban military patrols, and a couple of key bridges
along the arms supply route in the dead o f night and withdrawing unseen from Nicaragua
to their Honduran bases.”20
Illegal shipments o f arms from Miami to Honduras continued unimpeded. General
advice on how to smuggle weapons out of Miami was provided by CIA officials. The aim
of administrative policy was to draw the line in El Salvador and redraw it in Nicaragua.
The press was, at the time, told that the U.S. was supporting only political “moderates”
and that “no support would be given to followers o f General Somoza.”21
In March o f 1982, two key bridges were destroyed by contras. The Sandinistas
reacted by declaring a state o f emergency that mandated prior censorship o f military
information, restricted the right to strike, and limited freedom o f movement in the war
zones. The armed forces were put on lull alert. U.S. officials denounced the state of
emergency they had provoked as a sign o f Nicaraguan totalitarianism. There were no
reminders that every government, no matter how democratic, employs extraordinary
measures in times o f war including the U.S. In May o f 1982, CIA officials confirmed U.S.
involvement in the plot to blow up the bridges.22 This effected no objection from the
House Intelligence Committee as the bridges were thought to support illicit arms traffic
from Nicaragua to the guerillas in El Salvador. “We had to do that,” one member said.
Throughout 1982 the contra war expanded in scope and sophistication. Mercenaries
from throughout the world were recruited for missions in Central America.23 Contra
forces assassinated many minor Nicaraguan government officials.24 A customs warehouse
was burned. From March 14 to June 21, 1982, there were at least 106 insurgent incidents
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(by contra forces) within Nicaragua.23 Buildings were destroyed, crops were burned, and
health officials killed. The U.S. held numerous exercises with warships off the Nicaraguan
coasts. U.S. spy planes often flew over Nicaragua in violation of Nicaraguan airspace.
Airstrips were enlarged in Honduras and Costa Rica.
As former contra spokesman Edgar Chamorro explained to the World Court,
1982 was a year o f transition for the FDN ... from a collection of small,
disorganized and ineffectual bands o f ex-National guardsmen, the FDN
grew into a well-organized, well-armed, well-equipped, and well-trained
fighting force o f approximately 4,000 men capable of inflicting great harm
on Nicaragua. This was due entirely to the CIA which organized, armed,
equipped, trained, and supplied us...After the initial recruitment o f exGuardsmen from throughout the region (to serve as officers or
commanders o f military units), efforts were made to recruit ‘foot soldiers’
for the force from inside Nicaragua. Some Nicaraguans joined the force
voluntarily, either because o f dissatisfaction with the Nicaraguan
government, family ties with leaders o f the force, promises o f food,
clothing, boots, and weapons or a combination o f these reasons. Many
other members o f the force were recruited forcibly. FDN units would
arrive at an undefended village, assemble all the residents in the town
square and then proceed to kill, in full view of the others, all persons
suspected o f working for the Nicaraguan government or the FSLN,
including police, local militia members, party members, health workers,
teachers, and farmers from government-sponsored cooperatives. In this
atmosphere, it was not difficult to persuade those able-bodied men left
alive to return with the FDN units to their base camps in Honduras and
enlist in the force. This was, unfortunately, a widespread practice that
accounted for many recruits.26

In Tinotega, there was a contra commander known as “El Tigrillo” (little tiger). “He had
a reputation o f being a rapist, recruiting people by force ... a very abusive person. There
were other commanders who had the reputation o f intimidating people - ‘if you don’t join,
we kill you.’” There was one more group o f recruits, they were just “adventurers that join
anything that goes by and promises a new, better life ... or some are just bored with life .
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or they see an opportunity to leave their wife with children like they’ve done before.”27
The contras reportedly also recruited unemployed Hondurans.
In July o f 1981, Eden Pastora, a prominent Sandinista war hero, resigned his post as
Nicaraguan National Chief o f the People’s Militia and Deputy Minister of Defense and
went underground. He emerged in April of 1982, denouncing the Sandinista leadership
and vowing to overthrow them. By July 1982, he was on the CIA payroll and in charge of
the southern front.28 Pastora did not fit well within the FDN hierarchy. Contra leaders,
Bermudez and Lau, stationed in Honduras, wanted him dead. The Nicaraguan people
condemned Pastora and held large rallies in Managua portraying him as a traitor to the
people and the revolution with no concern for the national sovereignty o f Nicaragua.
The war between the British and the Argentines severed the Argentine-Contra
connection when the U.S. publicly backed the British. The war ended June 14, 1982 with
a British military victory. In the wake of defeat, the Argentine military dictatorship gave
way to an elected government. The Argentine military withdrew their contra advisers.
The FDN amassed a long record of atrocities against Nicaraguan citizens and little
public support inside or outside Nicaragua. Like death swooping down, the contra killed
and intimidated the Nicaraguan populace with U.S. supplied arms. There are numerous
books on this topic which are well researched, notably Contra Terror In Nicaragua:
Report o f a Fact-finding Mission: September 1984-January 1985, by Reed Brody, a U.S.
lawyer who documents hundreds o f contra attacks.29 Many o f the 145 legally sufficient
affidavits Brody obtained were independently verified by news sources like The New York
Times1 Americas Watch and CBS Evening News. Christopher Dickey, a journalist, lived
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and traveled with the contras throughout 1983, and later published a brilliant and
penetrating account, With The Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds o f Nicaragua.30 Other
first hand sources are Blood o f The Innocent: Victims o f the Contras ’ War in Nicaragua
31 by Toefilo Cabestrero, a Spanish Priest and journalist, and The Contras: Interviews with
Anti-Sandinistas authored by Dieter Eich, a German engineer and sociologist and Carlos
Rinchon, humanities scholar.32
The F.D.N. command structure was dominated by ex-Guardia.33 Advice and
direction came from the CIA “There were always two tracks” a CIA official explained,
“the publicly stated CIA objective o f interdicting weapons to the Salvadoran guerillas and
the overthrow o f the Sandinista government.”34 “It would have defied logic for anyone to
think that the sole purpose o f the anti-Sandinista soldier was to intercept arms traveling
down a trail.”35
By 1983, there were numerous documented assassinations by contra forces and the
CIA felt compelled to commission a manual on Psychological Operations in Guerilla
Warfare.30 The cover story was falling apart and Congress was getting testy. The
business o f this manual was to convince the fighters that what they did was noble and their
cause worthwhile. The problem with the manual is that it condoned the killing and
kidnapping o f non-combatants and went on to explain how to rationalize the killings. The
manual suggested slogans to help people appreciate contra weapons and promises to
return the people to a true democracy. Given that the system before the revolution was a
dictatorship and that it was well known that top contra commanders and some field
personnel were ex-Guardia, it was hardly surprising that few Nicaraguans were inspired by
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these empty phrases. Armed propaganda was outlined: Destroy military or police
installations, remove survivors to a public place, set up ambushes, cut communication
lines, humiliate “personnel symbols” of the government, reduce the influence o f individuals
in tune with the regime and take them out o f town. The manual also outlined how to
develop and control a front organization in urban areas. Criminals should be hired to carry
out some o f the FDN’s dirty work.
The story o f the manual broke in 1984, just before Reagan and Mondale were to
debate foreign policy. Congress acted appalled. What was important in the legalistic
minds o f the Capitol was that the manual seemed a direct contravention of a presidential
directive explicitly barring the CIA from getting involved in assassinations. “No person
employed by or acting on behalf o f the U.S. Government should engage in or conspire to
engage in assassinations.”
Staff from the CIA was flabbergasted. They though that this was a war. Back in
1983, secret CIA briefings already admitted that “Sandinista officials in the provinces, as
well as heads o f cooperatives, nurses, doctors, and judges” had been killed by contra
rebels. Duane Clarrige, head o f the CIA’s Latin American divisio, said “these events don’t
constitute assassinations because as far as we are concerned, assassinations are only those
o f heads o f state.”37 One CIA agent in Honduras said, “let’s face it, our people are
teaching people (contras) how to kill people, how to set up ambushes, how to set up a
Claymore (landmine) so it can kill the most people.” Another CIA veteran suggested that
it wasn’t the manual that made killers o f the FDN’s commanders. Most in the CIA
thought the manual flap would quickly blow over. However, the manual epitomized in the
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eyes o f Congress the clumsiness and dubious morality o f the covert program and led to a
freeze o f U.S. contra funding in the fell o f 1984.
The CIA also produced a second manual called The Freedom Fighters Manual,
which was written in comic book style.38 The emphasis in this short book was on
sabotage techniques ranging from petty acts to life threatening violence. The manual
reads like textbook monkey wrenching. Its explicit aim was to be a guide to “liberate
Nicaragua from oppression and misery by paralyzing the military-industrial complex o f the
traitorous Marxist state without having to use special tools and with minimal risk for the
combatant.” “Don’t do maintenance work. Hide and damage tools ... arrive late to work
... call in sick to work ... leave lights o n ... leave water taps on ... plant flowers on State
farm s... hoard and steal food ... drop typewriters... paint anti-Sandinista slogans ... pour
water in gas tanks ... put dirt in the carburetor... take an ice pick to the gas tank, tires,
and radiators ... put nails on roads and highways ... make a molotov cocktail” (the
illustration shows a man throwing it at a police station), and so forth.
Even with all the CIA training and funding, the contra army virtually disintegrated
under fire out in the bush. Commanders were making fools o f themselves. There were
numerous failures. The contras employed inhuman field practices and they showed
themselves to be incompetent also.39 The CIA was falling into an old pattern; American
military was failing.
“I f the FDN and Pastora’s people can’t really do things that hurt, then it’s got to be
worked out another way,” is the way, one senior intelligence official recalls the attitude
during that period.40 “There was a push to have some kind o f success in Nicaragua,
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something that would quell congressional criticism.” Large scale violent injuring is
necessary to win both the war and congressional support. When the contras couldn’t do
the job alone, more violent machinery was brought in to fill the gap.
In high-tech operations, for obvious reasons o f discipline and skill, the CIA preferred
to use its own people. “Unilaterally controlled Latino assets” it called the men it
contracted from Ecuador and various other South American countries. In September and
October o f 1983, a series o f attacks on Nicaragua’s port facilities were begun.41 Before
dawn on October 10, 1983, millions o f gallons o f fuel erupted into flames on the Corinto
waterfront. The FDN claimed responsibility, but no Nicaraguan had anything to do with
the attack. “Latino assets” using speedboats to work from a CIA mother ship anchored
several miles out at sea had carried it out.42
The CIA and the U.S. were feeling more potency after they had easily taken over the
tiny Caribbean island o f Grenada. On January 2, 1984, an assistant woke contra
spokesman Edgar Chamorro and gave him a press statement. The FDN had mined
Nicaragua’s harbors, it said. Telegrams were to be sent to Lloyd’s of London so that
insurance rates would rise. The FDN dutifully claimed credit. But the FDN had not done
any part o f that job either or other mining operations that followed. The CIA’s men,
working off a mother ship again, had planted the small explosive devices in the harbors.
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The idea was to squeeze the Sandinistas economy as the contra forces themselves were
never able to do. The effort failed. Most ships continued to come in, despite some
damage. Exxon announced that it would no longer send its tankers into Nicaraguan ports,
but - in a now familiar pattern - the Soviet Union soon moved to fill the gaps with its own
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ships.
The first reports o f all this went largely unremarked in Washington. But when the
French offered to clear the ports and other American allies began to protest the operation,
Congress started to take note.44 The Senate felt it had been deceived. Nicaragua took the
matter o f the mining and the entire secret war to the World Court, won, and the Reagan
administration had to disavow the court’s jurisdiction.45 The pretense o f legality for the
operation against Nicaragua was being stripped away along with its secrecy.
In the wake o f the temporary loss of U.S. Congressional support for the Contras,
numerous international networks were set up to funnel expertise, money, and guns to the
contra cause. In clear violation o f numerous laws and the Boland amendment, deals were
struck with South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, China, and Iran as
well as with numerous private organizations.46 Illegal air support systems were
established throughout the contra war, resulting in the infamous Hasenfus capture.47
Reagan suffered some political fallout from these activities when the Iran-Contra hearings
were broadcast live nationwide in 1987.
In 1985, Reagan declared an embargo on Nicaragua which remained firmly in place
until 1990 when UNO candidate Violeta Chamorro was elected president and the
Sandinistas were voted out o f power by their own people. Throughout the 1980’s the
U.S. was successful in discouraging and prohibiting Nicaragua from receiving badly
needed loans and aid from the International Monetary Fund.48
Let me be clear that my attempt in this chapter was to briefly outline the general
strategies o f the contra war. This is not an exhaustive account and is only intended to
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provide a glimpse into the various facets, dimensions, and levels of terror perpetrated on
Nicaragua by the U.S. during the contra war. There is much more to this sordid tale
which is available in references. The contra war wound down in the late 1980’s as peace
accords and cease-fires began to take hold. A program o f amnesty and demilitarization o f
the contras, in conjunction with a radical downsizing of the Nicaraguan military was
agreed upon. In the next several sections the empirical consequences of the contra war
are outlined, with an emphasis on the period 1980-1985.
By May 1986, a total o f 4,429 war related deaths had been reported in Nicaragua.49
The dead included at least 210 persons under 12 years o f age, 274 high school or college
students, and 76 technicians or professionals.50 Nearly a third of all deaths occurred
among civilians.51 The rate o f war related deaths among Nicaraguans exceeds that of the
United States during the Viet Nam War or World War II.52 By the end of 1985, over 100
rural communities had been attacked, 345 vehicles had been ambushed, and 51
assassinations o f local leaders by contras had been reported.53
Among survivors o f contra attacks, the predominant wound site is the lower
extremities as a result o f fragmentation and explosion caused by mines and mortars.54
Contra leaders had made a strategic decision to expand such attacks with materials and
guidance supplied through United States congressional appropriations.55 The methods of
the contras had remained the same throughout the 1980's. During the 18 month (March
1988 to November 1989) unilateral cease fire, contras killed 736, wounded 1,153 and
kidnapped 1,481. The total killed in the contra war was over 30,000 as o f March 1,
1990.56
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In four major wars o f the twentieth century, a minority o f all casualties became
fatalities.57 In contrast, among Nicaraguan casualties since 1982, close to half were
fatalities.58 This appears to result from the particular nature of the contra attacks: mining
o f rural roads, mortar attacks on isolated villages, and ambushing vehicles. Contra
military strategies have resulted in a high number of casualties among health personnel.
By December 1985, 42 salaried health workers were reported to have been killed by
contras, 31 others were kidnapped, and 11 more were reported to have been wounded.59
Some o f the medical victims, such as Dr. Gustavo Sequira, Vice Dean of the Managua
Medical School, and Dr. Myrna Cunningham, Governor o f the Northern Zelaya province,
were well-known members o f the Nicaraguan medical establishment. Most victims,
however, were young health professionals who worked in isolated rural communities.60
"Low Intensity Conflict" targeted the civilian population for hostilities. Doctors, nurses
and patients were frequent victims. It goes without saying that this violated customary
and statutory international law regarding the neutrality o f health personnel in situations of
war.
Contra actions led to the destruction o f 300 work centers and 58 schools and the
closing o f 502 more, and the destruction o f 2,100 homes and 11 social welfare centers as
o f early 1986.61 This has reportedly affected 7% of elementary students and 6% of adult
education students.62 Sixty-five health facilities, including four large clinics and one
hospital, were reported to have been completely or partially destroyed.63 In addition, 37
health units in war zones were abandoned by the government. The loss in available
facilities coincided with an increased need for medical and social services. The war
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created a large group o f disabled young adults needing rehabilitative care and equipment.
About nine thousand orphans resulted from death to adults.64 The Nicaraguan
government estimates that close to 10% of the country's inhabitants lost access to health
services because o f war.65
The Nicaraguan Ministry o f Health estimated that a total o f $25 million in damage to
the health system was sustained.66 The economic value o f destruction to the health system
was only a small part o f the estimated $2 billion worth o f losses sustained by the country
as a result o f the war through 1985.67
Contra attacks, lack o f supplies, and war related economic instability forced about
250,000 Nicaraguans from their homes. About half o f the displaced resettled in some 80
new communities established by the government in areas near their original homes.68
Most o f the displaced fled to major cities. This migration was a severe strain on the social
and health infrastructure o f the country. Emergency services were established for new
relocation settlements. Setting up these emergency services was a severe drain on the
country's economy, since defense and reconstruction consumed most o f the national
budget.69
During the period o f January 1983 to April 1985, the number o f malaria cases
detected in the war zones was 17 % greater than the monthly average during the previous
eight years.70 War-related population movements, the inability to carry out timely disease
control activities, and shortages o f health personnel in the war zones are likely responsible
for the inability to reduce malaria transmission in these areas. Underreporting o f malaria
cases in areas o f conflict underestimates the differences in malaria incidence in the war and
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non-war zones.71 Malaria moves from the war zones into the rest of the country. An
investigation o f positive cases in three o f the eight non-war provinces during the first six
months o f 1984 showed that 78% of all slide-verified cases were imported from war
zones.72 The risk of contracting and reporting a case from these areas was 7.6 times
greater than the rest o f the country,
A measles epidemic in 1985-86 appeared to be intimately related to the war.
Coverage o f children under five years o f age with measles vaccine had risen to above 50%
for the first time in Nicaragua in 1982. Successive community health campaigns and
immunizations provided through the primary health system further raised coverage in
ensuing years. This was associated with the reporting o f 200 to 75 cases per year in a
declining trend during 1981-84. With the growth o f the war in 1983, coverage with
measles vaccines declined in war Regions One and Six. More importantly, many isolated
rural communities went wholly unvaccinated because of the danger posed by the war to
health volunteers and medical professionals. This lack o f coverage continued through
1985, creating a large pool o f susceptibles under five years of age. By July o f 1985, an
epidemic was noted in Region Six. By February 1986, the epidemic had spread to Region
One. During the first nine months o f 1986, Regions One and Six registered 51% o f the
2,021 measles cases reported in Nicaragua. No cases o f polio have been reported since
1981. Promotion o f maternal immunization since 1983 has brought a gradual reduction in
the number o f reported cases o f neonatal tetanus, from 132 in 1981 to 76 in 1985. The
decline in neonatal tetanus cases would likely have been greater if the war had not
disrupted efforts to train and supply rural midwives.73

98

Estimated infant mortality levels have remained stable since 1983 at 76 per 1,000
births. This follows rapid improvements in Nicaragua's mortality profile from 1979 to
1983.74 A survey o f 10,000 homes in 1986 found a more rapid decline in infant mortality
in outlying regions than was expected. There is evidence, however, of a rise in infant
mortality rates in Managua during the period of 1985-87. This rise may be the result of a
rapid influx o f people from the war zones.
When the Sandinistas ousted the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the United States
shifted its most stable geopolitical "home base" northward to Honduras, which shares
borders with Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. This vigorous Honduran role in
Central America is causing a series of environmental problems. A high ranking official
from the Honduran Ecological Association recently told a member of EPOC A, the
Environmental Project on Central America, that "although we are very grateful to U.S.AID for its support for our environmental programs," this support is "overwhelmed by
U.S. military spending."75
Honduras and the United States staged nearly continuous joint military maneuvers
from 1980 to 1985. United States military aid increased nearly fifty-fold since 1979,
topping $190 million in 1984.76 The United States armed forces have used the maneuvers
to build numerous military bases, roads, port facilities, warehouse sites and airfields. Nine
military air bases have been built in Honduras since the Reagan administration took office.
The United States has also built, housed, armed and trained the Contra army o f over
10,000 men.
Although the environmental impact of these activities is difficult to assess, some
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evidence is beginning to emerge. The main impact has been the destruction of forests. A
document produced by Honduras' State Forestry Corporation claimed that the United
States-Honduran joint maneuvers known as Cabanas-86 destroyed 10% of the country's
pine forests on the savanna near the Nicaraguan border.77 The military conflict has a
ripple effect throughout the ecology o f the region. The contra war created war-related
movement o f people and animals. A confidential report to the President o f Honduras by a
number o f government agencies asserts that the contra war threatened their second most
important export base, namely, forests. According to newspaper accounts "Nicaraguan
refugees and contras have generated a wave o f destruction in Honduran forests." While
Salvadoran refugees were kept in camps surrounded by soldiers, some 20,000 Nicaraguan
refugees, according to the report, were subject to little control. The resultant
environmental destruction included deforestation for subsistence agriculture, land clearing
to establish contra bases, black market export o f parrots, and illegal exploitation of tree
species including mahogany, cedar and pine.
The United States, true to form, ignored the environmental impact o f its activities in
Honduras and Nicaragua. Joseph G. Hanley, spokesman for the United States National
Guard, which actively participated in United States military projects in Honduras, told the
Washington Post that engineering projects in Honduras are "less environmentally
constrained" than in the United States. "If you're building a road," he said, "you don’t
have to worry about the width o f the culverts, about the Environmental Protection Agency
•

or about the environmentalists. Those are not concerns down here."

78

The Honduran Ecological Association (HEC) disagreed with Mr. Hanley.
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According to one o f its leaders, "we are very concerned about these roads. They are
causing significant erosion and sedimentation in our aquifers." The HEC claimed that
United States soldiers were shooting Honduran wildlife for sport. The United States
troops also brought live parrots home with them as souvenirs of their tour of duty.79 The
United States-backed contra army based on Honduras' southern border with Nicaragua
increased pressure on diminishing forest animal populations by eating them. According to
Adolfo Calero, a Contra leader, "most o f our people have to feed themselves on
wildlife."80
In addition to causing ecological destruction in their host countries o f Honduras and
Costa Rica, the United States-backed contras targeted environmentalists and their
programs in the war to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government. The contras attack
environmentalism as part o f a coordinated strategy to disrupt government programs and
separate the general population from the Sandinistas by making it clear that government
programs - health, education, agriculture and environment - were contra targets.
Within Nicaragua, contras directly attacked environmentalists and their projects in
the field. In the years 1985-87 the contras burned reforested areas, destroyed tree
nurseries, jeeps and offices. Nicaragua's environmental agency, DIRENA, closed the
country's only tropical rain forest national reserve, the Salaya National Park, in 1983,
when contras kidnapped the park's administrator and two rangers.81
The program and staff o f DIRENA (formerly IRENA) was decimated by a series of
budget cuts in 1989 which slashed all government programs - from defense to
environment - by 40% to 70%. Previously an autonomous agency, DIRENA has been
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subsumed under the Ministry o f Agriculture (MIDINRA) and is now reduced primarily to
serving the more immediate priority o f supporting the food production system. Many of
DIRENA's ambitious wildlands and reforestation projects begun in the late 1980’s were
shelved due to the exigencies o f Nicaragua's survival economy. The official inflation rate
in 1988 in Nicaragua was 1300%.
Some o f the more toxic pesticides that the Sandinista government banned in 1980
(like DDT, aldrin and dieldrin) are being used again because there are no alternatives.
Despite a historical commitment to worker safety and environmental protection
MIDINRA is constrained now to provide resources to maximize food production, which
means distributing leftover pesticides donated by foreign governments or pulling banned
chemicals out o f storage.82 The soft path is quickly abandoned in favor o f a harsh
technologically specified solution. War abruptly pushes hard technology to the surface
when progressive alternatives are no longer sustainable.
Lake Managua is now one o f the most polluted lakes in the world. This tragedy is
due to industrial contamination with mercury and silting, which results from
deforestation.83 Raw sewage from Managua flows into Lake Managua; it is abhorrent that
even by 1990 there was not even primary treatment of Managua’s municipal wastewater.
DDT was also used in pre-Revolutionary Nicaragua to control malarial misquitos. The
people o f Nicaragua now have among the highest concentrations of DDT in human fluids,
like breast milk, o f any country in the world.84
Chemicals, poisons and pesticides created significant health problems among
workers. By 1979, each cotton crop was sprayed an average of 28 times with chemical
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pesticides.85 Few workers were taught to practice safety measures when handling these
pesticides. The situation is better now, Spanish precaution labels appear on containers,
(they used to be in English) and most people can read.
The point of United States sponsored contra intervention in Nicaragua was injury
and terror, not military victory. The attitude o f U.S. planners was that the resulting
morbidity and mortality rates were an acceptable price to pay. That Nicaraguans suffered
to accomplish U.S. strategic and ideological goals seems to have been studiously ignored.
In summary, the contra war was palpable inside Nicaragua. In the U.S. there were very
few, if any, direct consequences either politically or economically. Nicaragua is such a
small economy even under the best of situations that any economic effects o f the contra
war inside the U.S. did not even register. As stated earlier, the policy device procured
only limited political drama and several congressional reports on the internal side o f the
divide. Even when the “secret war” became well known, there was limited social action
on the internal side o f the divide. The U.S. government frowned upon individuals and
groups, which sought to directly engage the “enemy,” thus step outside its assigned role of
silent passive consumer. Many were moved to simply fly down to Nicaragua and check it
out. There were numerous, and still are, work brigades, Spanish intensive workshops and
independent fact finding missions to Nicaragua. The most moving accounts o f the contra
war came from first hand observation and reporting. Witness for Peace had North
American volunteers living in the war zones and in Managua throughout the 1980’s.
There were also numerous protest rallies throughout the United States and abroad in
opposition to the contra war. The war was generally well covered by the press. The basic
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structure o f the contra war was evident if one scratched even a little below the surface of
official policy statements. However, due to its relative hiddenness and an indifferent
public, the contra war continued unabated throughout the 1980’s.
The contra war had its paradigmatic inaccessibility and an underlying structure
similar to the long-standing policy devices described in Chapter 3. Nicaragua, throughout
the twentieth century, and specifically during the contra war, was assigned the role of
external component o f the policy device. Workers and leaders who successfully revolted
against Somoza unsuccessfully attempted socialism. Socialism proved to be unworkable
just as the authoritarian regime was. In both cases the people never rose above the
ontological status o f external component o f the policy device. The system that “allowed”
people to be obedient poor workers exacted a high price when these same workers tried to
assert their sovereignty and autonomy. Since the local side of the policy device, which
during “peacetime” was the Somoza dictatorship, was no longer present (its base o f power
dissolved), another wing o f the device had to be created in nearby “host” countries of
Honduras and Costa Rica. The U.S. tried to unify militarily and ideologically contra
forces on two fronts. By basically paying thousands of people this was accomplished. On
a short term, instrumental level, contra attacks were extremely successful in causing injury
to bodies and cultural artifacts. Although the contras were not militarily successful against
the Sandinista Army, the contra war (and economic mismanagement) resulted in a new
government and a return to power o f some of the same groups that lost power in 1979.

Chapter 5
Conclusions

The role o f the U.S. government during the contra war as planners rather than
killers mirrors a similar division in U.S. culture. Absorbed in fantasies o f consumption,
American culture easily conceals from itself its culpability abroad. By not seeing through
the policy device to its dark external underside, cultural indifference reigns.

People in the

U.S. fail to see themselves as a seamless extension o f the internal component o f the policy
device. Technology and indifference, it appears, are one and the same. One does not
cause the other, yet neither exists independently. Where the strong hand o f technology is
near, indifference reigns.
Political choices o f 1990 and 1996 within Nicaragua indicate that, in the main,
Nicaragua has rejected the extreme authoritarianism o f Somoza and the socialism of the
Sandinistas. These election results show the rise o f the standard version o f the device
paradigm and its indifference to strong social justice within Nicaragua. The conversion of
Nicaragua’s citizens from external to internal members o f the device paradigm will come
only after periods o f extreme poverty and strong political and economic integration with
the world economy. Voting patterns, and changes within Sandinista ideology and
strategy, indicate this direction o f social change.
Looking back, when a revolutionary process reaches political power, any cost can be
justified. The joy o f victory gives meaning to the bitter passages of the past, especially in
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the first days after the overthrow of a repressive regime. Success justifies, in the popular
imagination and in the discourses o f the new political rulers, the sacrifices that have been
made. In failure, on the other hand, judgment tends to be implacable, and a balanced
analysis is rare. The thoroughness o f defeat rules out any appeal to original intentions and
factors that came into play afterwards.
Did revolution fail in Central America, then, or did it succeed? The easiest answer is
that it failed: it failed to take power in El Salvador and Guatemala, and in Nicaragua it lost
power in less time that it took to win it. This is the common currency in the international
press. It carries an undeniable finger-shaking value: if the revolutionary strategy failed and
Central America is back in the hands of those who ruled it all along, surely there is no
point in trying anything so crazy again. Besides, as shown in Chapter Four, Nicaragua
emerged from a decade o f war with its economy destroyed and in the midst of a crisis
whose weight has fallen disproportionately on the very social groups that heeded the
revolutionaries’ siren call. During the 1980’s the gross domestic product per person fell
by 41 percent in Nicaragua, 18 percent in Guatemala and 15 percent in El Salvador.1
Turning the same logic in a different direction, however, one could easily blame the
damage on the resistance o f ruling groups to social change, their insistence on holding on
to their social privilege, their commitment to authoritarianism. If the ruling groups had
been less intransigent, in short, things might have been different. Faced with electoral
failure and the continual defeat o f reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, many in Central
America concluded that there was nothing left but to accept the appeal o f revolution, or at
least collaborate with it, to have a chance at political success and a minimum o f personal
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well-being.
Was that a mistake? Should people have gone on accepting poverty and exploitation,
repression and bloodshed? Should they have accepted electoral fraud and abuse as
inevitable? These questions go far beyond the Central American case alone. They are part
o f the always-open question whether to resist oppression. When legal routes are closed
off, must one be resigned to it? Who can be sure that, if the Nicaraguan people had
accepted the Somoza dictatorship or the triumphant return o f the contras or if
Guatemalans and Salvadorans had resigned themselves to repression, exploitation and
fraud, they would be better off today.
The Central American social revolutionary project, like any other, sought to control
government in order to “democratize” political power, change socioeconomic conditions,
improve workers’ access to resources - land, work, food, education, health - and reclaim
national sovereignty. Our verdict on that project, therefore, cannot be reduced to the
question o f government or the state, even though that is one o f its basic elements. As
shown in Chapter 3, revolutionary mobilization by itself, opened the way for some social
transformations and the emergence o f new actors who have contributed to changing
certain aspects o f their respective communities and societies. The struggle to transform
those designated external (workers) into the internal component of the device paradigm
(consumers) will be a difficult and treacherous path, but one, that needs to be taken
nonetheless.
As for the Sandinista program some general conclusions can be drawn. The
organizational structure and internal procedures of the revolutionary party are important
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and need to be fluid and change when external conditions change. In wartime the
structure tends to be rigid, hierarchical and clandestine. In peace time the structure and
“party line” must be more open to substantive discussion and criticism. Content, results
and publicly accountable internal processes must replace vague proposals to change the
world.
What was difficult for the Sandinistas to understand was that their programs were
sandwiched between promises o f liberty and prosperity and the more mundane tasks o f
securing genuine technological accomplishments. The former come from advanced
industrial countries and are broadcast via television and advertisements, the latter are the
trench work o f eliminating disease, hunger, illiteracy and landlessness. There was
insufficient progress in the latter and regression in the former. All a Nicaraguan had to do
was turn on television to see the disparity between what they desired and what Sandinista
slogans promised. When it became obvious that a socialist approach could make almost
no progress on either front (commodities or machineries), the Sandinistas were quickly
and consistently voted out o f top national offices. They remain a formidable political force
but no longer have universal appeal. The socialist idea that the population has to be
protected from the outside world no longer holds sway.
Thus Nicaragua and much o f the third world are caught between the glamour and
appeal o f technological life and the mundane politics devoted to new roads, upgrading
schools and clinics and teaching people to read and write. Obviously, in a country where
in 1997 40% o f the population makes about 1 U.S. dollar per day2, any improvement in
material conditions would be welcomed. Lasting material and cultural improvement will
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come for Nicaragua only when government and business cooperate to liberate people from
toil and starvation while also strictly respecting human rights.
A guerrilla organization does not have to spell out its program o f struggle in any
great detail. A political party, on the other hand, must offer voters as complete a platform
as possible. When a guerrilla organization molts into a political party, it must flesh out
specific proposals to address and resolve people’s problems surrounding core issues like
security, work, health, food and education. Political slogans will no longer suffice. War
allows a large number o f economic and social questions to wait until “later.” Through the
contra war new social programs, which could not wait, were physically attacked to ensure
failure. The factors that set off revolutionary processes ricochet through history setting
into motion a wide array o f social actions. Could the Sandinistas have foreseen the depth
and U.S. support for a counterrevolutionary army?
As a guerrilla movement matures into a political party expectations will rise. A
former guerrilla organization will often win more votes than expected in its first electoral
outing as the Sandinistas did in 1984. They promise to get things done and change the
system. But good intentions quickly bog down in bureaucracy; parliamentary majorities
can block (or reverse) reforms, and people begin to notice that the guerrillas have
gradually grown into the style and appearance o f old political professionals. The elections
o f 1990 and 1996 in Nicaragua showed that the populace will not sit idly by while the
FSLN learns to act as a political party.
The installation o f contra forces as a legitimate political force inside Nicaragua was
an unsuccessful attempt by the U.S. to create a new local, controllable, element of the
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policy device. When the Somoza government and Guardia dissolved in 1979, the smooth
functioning o f the local element o f an imperialistic policy device shattered. The contras,
with support from farmers nationwide, indigenous groups from the Atlantic coast, the
Catholic church, numerous internal fronts, the middle bourgeoisie, and the U.S., were to
be ushered into power. But ultimately the middle bourgeoisie returned to power, and the
contras disarmed and disbanded as did most o f the Sandinista Army.
Although the size and importance o f the Nicaraguan economy did not appear to
justify outfitting a counterrevolutionary army, deep ideological and security concerns
dominated this sordid enterprise. Politics within the internal side of the device (U.S.)
fueled the engine o f contra war policy. An indifferent public, the large mass of people that
compose the internal group, is paralyzed by a moral callousness consistent with the
dangers o f technology described in Chapter 2. As the Sandinistas tried to exert control
over concerns that were external to the policy device, such as literacy, environment, health
and agrarian reform, there was a coincident and forbidding problem o f apolitical mass
consumption within the internal population. Social indifference created the large political
opening necessary for the Reagan administration to finance, plan and implement the contra
war.
As imperialism wrested North America from the Indian tribes, significant benefits
accrued to immigrants and the government. Vast resources were obtained to provide
food, housing, energy and land for a growing nation. The contra war was different; there
were no direct tangible benefits for the U.S. populace. Gas and oil prices were not at
stake. We did not need Nicaraguan coffee, sugar, beef or cotton to survive. The U.S.
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economic embargo (1985-1990) had no effect on the U.S. economy. Only the external
side, the Nicaraguan side, felt the loss of trade and foreign exchange. The only payback to
the U.S. taxpayers, who helped finance the contra war, is that certain expropriated
properties were returned, and U.S. trade and investment is marginally growing.
The best I can hope for is atonement and forgiveness, some attempt to dress the
wound and feel the shrapnel buried deep inside. Rewriting history along the lines of
neoliberal trade policies will never adequately address the horror and injuries. At best,
capitalism can stabilize and lower interest rates and inflation, and allow for intelligent,
compassionate investment. However, even this “utopia” would ignore the deeper and
more troubling problem o f how technology tends to eviscerate human thought and
engagement with the world. During the contra war we had terror and indifference.
Today we have an even less tractable situation, peace and indifference.
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